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Introduction
In 1984 Britain and the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered into
an agreement providing for termination of Hong Kong's status as a
Crown Colony and "resum[ption of] the exercise of sovereignty" over the
territory by China in 1997.1 Under the terms of the Joint Declaration
(Declaration), China bound itself to limit its exercise of sovereignty in
the interest of "maint[aining] the prosperity and stability of Hong
Kong."'2 The Declaration promises local autonomy and the perpetuation
of the current economic and social systems. It also includes a "bill of
rights" which, if effective, would preserve for Hong Kong residents per-
sonal and economic freedoms still unknown on the Mainland.
The Declaration represents a creative attempt to solve the familiar
problem of decolonization in a unique set of circumstances. In contrast
to other decolonized territories, Hong Kong is a wealthy and modem
city. Its soon-to-be "parent" country is a major world power which has
for decades emphasized its intent to recover what it considers to be its
territory. These characteristics create a basis for the argument, consist-
ently put forward by China, that the established norms of decolonization
have no relevance for Hong Kong. In addition, state practice has shown
that the international legal framework governing decolonization, which
requires self-determination for colonized peoples, has been ineffective in
the face of resolute opposition by an interested state. Britain and China
have ignored the United Nations' procedures for decolonization, and
structured a purely bilateral solution to the Hong Kong problem.
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University. The author would like to thank Professor Michael
Reisman and Mark Sheldon.
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, art. 1, 1984 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 20, reprinted in draft form in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Declaration].
2. Id. Preamble.
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Hong Kong residents played no role in choosing the policies and legal
structure that will determine their future. During the talks between
China and Britain leading up to the Declaration, China refused to allow
the people of Hong Kong a formal voice. China insisted that, as the
Chinese motherland, it already represented the wishes of the Chinese res-
idents of Hong Kong. It scorned the call for some measure of self-deter-
mination as an attempt to convert a bilateral process into a "three-legged
stool."'3 Britain and China therefore presented Hong Kong residents
with afait accompli. At present, residents of Hong Kong are participat-
ing in the drafting of the Basic Law that will implement the Declara-
tion's provisions, but the process is structured to leave them incapable of
blocking decisions made in Beijing.
4
This limited participation by Hong Kong residents does not mean that
Hong Kong's distinctive society will inevitably wither under PRC sover-
eignty. China has agreed in the Declaration to allow Hong Kong resi-
dents to control their own destiny, albeit subject to China's sovereignty.
Such an allocation of power would, if realized, reflect the international
norm that decolonized peoples have some control over their fate.5 The
likelihood of this promise being fulfiled is the subject of wide debate, and
the precedents are not encouraging.6 One thing is certain, however: if
Hong Kong does not make wise, determined use of the institutions China
has agreed to in the Declaration, the phrase "one country, two systems"7
will prove an empty slogan.
3. Xianggang Motion Causes Concern, 27 BEuING RFv. 6, 6-7 (Mar. 12, 1984); see also
Amberg, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840, 844 (1985) (focusing on Hong Kong residents' lack of input into the
process of determining their future status).
4. See Lau, Unequal Voices, FAR E. ECON. REv. 40 (Dec. 18, 1986) [hereinafter Unequal
Voices].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27-36.
6. For a discussion of international precedents in which neighboring states claim sover-
eignty over decolonizing territory, see infra text accompanying notes 43-48. The precedents
most obvious to Hong Kong residents are those of Shanghai after the communist victory,
where many of Hong Kong's leading entrepreneurs "burnt [their] fingers.., when the political
situation changed," Wong, Industrial Entrepreneurship and Ethnicity: A Study of the
Shanghainese Cotton Spinners in Hong Kong (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1979), quoted
in Wong, Modernization and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong, 106 CHINA Q. 306, 321 (1986)
[hereinafter Wong, Modernization], and China's governance of its five "autonomous regions,"
S. GOLDSTEIN, K. SEARS & R. BUSH, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A BASIC HAND-
BOOK 10 (4th ed. 1984). In the autonomous regions, despite constitutional guarantees of "re-
gional autonomy" and "freedom... to preserve or reform their own ways and customs,"
XIANFA (Constitution) art. 4 (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter PRC CONSTITUTION],
the central government has at times brutally repressed local customs and lifestyle. See, e.g.,
Lin, Tibet: Life Returns to an Anguished Land, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 12, 1985, at 22.
7. The "much trumpeted 'one country, two systems' solution," Iyer, Hong Kong: A Col-
ony's Uncertain Future, TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 38, 51, appeared early in the Sino-British nego-
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Since the signing of the Declaration, Hong Kong has largely ignored,
and to some degree misunderstood, one institution-the judiciary-that
could be a valuable tool in preserving its autonomy. Though the Decla-
ration's language is sometimes ambiguous, it provides a framework-an
"independent ' 8 judiciary with institutional authority and a pre-existing
organizational culture-that could allow that institution to monitor and
publicize China's compliance with the Declaration. Authoritative review
could serve to constrain China's actions in Hong Kong by ensuring that
any abridgment of the promised autonomy and rights occurs openly.
This constraint could be augmented if international institutions in which
Hong Kong will participate as an autonomous entity condition China's
double representation, in many cases as much a benefit to the Mainland
as to Hong Kong, on the fact of continuing autonomy.
Hong Kong courts, if they fulfill the promise of the Declaration, can
serve as the lens through which the world community monitors China's
performance with regard to international norms of self-determination
and human rights. In its judiciary, Hong Kong could find a "leg" to
stand on, an independent institution that could ensure that, unless China
openly abrogates its pledge to Britain, Hong Kong residents will con-
tinue to enjoy rights and freedoms not experienced by residents of today's
China.
This article explains how Hong Kong's judiciary can act, within the
framework laid out in the Declaration, to preserve the territory's liberties
and lifestyle. Part I presents the Declaration in historical context with
regard to both the Sino-British relationship and the international order
surrounding decolonization. Part II examines the legal structure of post-
colonial Hong Kong and the basic policies that the Declaration promises
will govern China's treatment of the territory. Part III analyzes the ex-
ecutive and legislative organs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) as the Declaration envisions them, and explains why
neither will be effective in preserving Hong Kong's autonomy and basic
freedoms. Part IV contends that the judiciary can be an important con-
straint on Mainland interference in local affairs: through the review
function implicit in the Declaration the courts can increase the cost to
China of deviating from promised policies, and thus make compliance
more likely. Finally, Part V suggests practical steps that Hong Kong and
Britain can take to prepare the judiciary for the difficult task before it,
and explains how the international community can act to make the prin-
tiations as a slogan encapsulating China's desired outcome. See, e.g., A Great Event of Historic
Significance, 27 BEIJING REv. 14, 15 (Oct. 1, 1984).
8. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 142-63.
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ciples of human rights and self-determination relevant in post-1997 Hong
Kong.
I. Background to the Sino-British Joint Declaration
A. The Legal History of British Hong Kong
Britain acquired Hong Kong through a series of treaties with China's
decaying Qing dynasty in the 19th century.9 China resented this incur-
sion into its territory from the outset, and throughout the twentieth cen-
tury has maintained that the British presence was the result of "unequal
treaties" that were "illegal and invalid." 10 Since its founding in 1949, the
PRC has consistently argued that "Hong Kong... [is] Chinese territory
occupied by British... imperialism on the strength of unequal treaties
... [which t]he Chinese people will recover.., without fail at an appro-
priate time."11
Although Hong Kong has been a potent symbol in China for arousing
nationalistic sentiment and criticizing Western imperialism, in practice
Britain and China long ago settled into a modus vivendi. Hong Kong's
role as an entrepot for the "China trade," initially based on opium and
secured by British gunboats, grew and diversified, and came eventually to
be tacitly accepted by China's rulers as a useful evil. By the beginning of
World War II, Hong Kong vied with Shanghai for the role of the most
important center for China's international trade.12 Since the war, and
particularly since 1949, the growth of local manufacturing and the steady
inflow of refugees from China have transformed the colony from a back-
ward port city serving the needs of the British Empire to a modern terri-
tory producing for and trading with the world.
1 3
9. Under the Treaty of Nanking, signed after Britain defeated China in the Opium War of
1842, China ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain in perpetuity. In 1860, the Convention of
Peking ceded the tip of Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island to Britain in perpetuity.
Finally, China granted Britain a 99-year lease on the New Territories, beginning July 1, 1898,
in the Convention of 1898. Karamanian, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on
the Future of Hong Kong, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 167, 168 (1985). In this article the term "Hong
Kong" will refer to the territory conveyed by all three treaties.
10. Commentaries on Xianggang Issue, 26 BEIJING REV. 13 (Oct. 17, 1983). The legal
history of Hong Kong can be gleaned from, inter alia, Karamanian, supra note 9, at 168-70;
Day, The Recovery of Hong Kong by the People's Republic of China-A Fifty Year Experiment
in Capitalism and Freedom, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 625, 629-33 (1984).
11. Khrushchev Group Turns World Youth Forum into Anti-China Forum, Sept. 25, 1964
[hereinafter Khrushchev Group], reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
381, 382 (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter COHEN & CHIU].
12. Shaw, An ROC View of the Hong Kong Issue, 22 IssUEs & STUD. 13, 18 (June 1986).
13. For a succinct description of Hong Kong's "economic miracle," see Jao, Hong Kong's
Future as a Free Market Economy, 22 IssuEs & STUD. 111, 111-12 (June 1986).
253
Yale Journal of International Law
During these years, millions of Chinese sought and found refuge in
Hong Kong from civil war, privation, and political persecution. The rel-
ative attractiveness of life under British rule, despite its offensive features,
is reflected in Hong Kong population statistics. In 1841, some 15,000
people lived in Hong Kong.14 On the eve of the Japanese occupation in
1941 this number had grown to 1.7 million. 15 Though many residents
fled inland during the war years to escape the Japanese, by 1951 the
number had reached 2.4 million,1 6 with most of the increase consisting of
people fleeing Mao Zedong's new government. 17 Since then, China's var-
ious political movements, such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great
Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution,' have driven hundreds of
thousands more to Hong Kong; its inhabitants today number approxi-
mately 5.5 million. 19
The fact that the majority of Hong Kong's residents voluntarily sought
to live under colonial rule highlights the fact that Hong Kong is an atypi-
cal colony. Indeed, the most widely agreed-upon description of colonial-
ism, United Nations Resolution 1514, seems grossly out of step with
conditions in Hong Kong. This resolution declares that "peoples of the
world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,"
that "colonialism prevents the development of international economic
co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of
dependent peoples," and "constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights."' 20 In contrast, the majority of Hong Kong residents apparently
prefer continuation of the political status quo to PRC displacement of
the colonial government. 21 Far from lagging behind in international eco-
nomic cooperation, Hong Kong under British rule has developed one of
the world's most vibrant international economies.22 Further, few would
contest that, however pompous and insensitive the British rulers might
14. D. BONAVIA, HONG KONG 1997: THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 23 (1985).
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id.
17. Shaw, supra note 12, at 16.
18. For a description of these political movements, see J. TOWNSEND & B. WOMACK,
POLrrics IN CHINA 113-41 (1986).
19. D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 28.
20. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter Reso-
lution 1514].
21. See Jao, supra note 13, at 120 n.15 and accompanying text; J. TOWNSEND & B. Wo-
MACK, supra note 18, at 422.
22. Hong Kong, with its minute population, is among the top twenty trading countries in
the world. Its exports equal China's. Prybyla, The Hong Kong Agreement and Its Impact on
the World Economy, 22 IssuEs AND STUD. 92, 97-98 (June 1986). In 1984, its gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita was US$5,951, compared to China's US$443. Jao, supra note 13, at
129.
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have been, Hong Kong's record of respecting "fundamental human
rights" compares very favorably with China's.23
China agrees that Hong Kong "does not at all fall under the ordinary
category of colonial territories," though for different reasons. 24 China's
position reflects a desire to prevent the international norm of self-deter-
mination for decolonized peoples25 from impeding its long-term goal of
reunifying the nation as historically constituted. 26 Given Hong Kong
residents' relative prosperity and demonstrated preference for the colo-
nial bureaucracy over that of the Mainland, China's concern for the re-
sult should the self-determination principle be rigidly applied is not
unfounded. However, its decision to opt out of the formal machinery
that the world community has established to manage decolonization does
23. On human rights in the PRC, see generally H. LIANG & J. SHAPIRO, INTELLECTUAL
FREEDOM IN CHINA AFTER MAO: WITH A Focus ON 1983, at 3 (1984) (describing abuse of
citizenry by government and party during Cultural Revolution); H. LIANG & J. SHAPIRO,
SON OF THE REVOLUTION (1983) (autobiographical account of growing up in the PRO); J.
COOPER, F. MICHAEL & Y. Wu, HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-MAO CHINA 47-53 (1985)
("[New legal procedures did not guarantee.. . basic rights. Equally impotent... was the
constitution." Id. at 48.). In 1982, still 4,237 pre-1949 Kuomintang (KMT) members contin-
ued to be held as political prisoners. Id. at 52. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA:
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1984).
24. Although China has consistently championed the rights of Third World peoples to be
free from imperial domination, it has resisted international interest in the recovery of the colo-
nies carved out of its own territory. When the People's Republic replaced Taiwan in the U.N.
in 1972, it requested the General Assembly's Special Committee on Colonialism to remove
Hong Kong and Macao from its list of colonial territories. China insisted that "settlement of
the questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right and does not
at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories.... The United Nations has no
right to discuss these questions." Letter from Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua to Chairman
of U.N. General Assembly Special Committee on Colonialism (Mar. 10, 1972), reprinted in
COHEN & CHIU, supra note 11, at 384; see also Commentaries on Xianggang Issue, supra note
10, at 13.
25. See M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 27 (1982).
26. In 1964, for example, the PRC strenuously objected to a USSR-inspired resolution at a
World Youth Forum calling for the "elimination of colonies in Asia":
The resolution put Hong Kong and Macao, which are China's territory, on a par with
Timor Island, Papua, Oman, Aden, and South Arabia and demanded "independence" for
the two places in accordance with the UN declaration.
The Chinese delegate... sternly condemned the erroneous approach.... He pointed
out that Hong Kong and Macao are Chinese territory occupied by British and Portugese
imperialism on the strength of unequal treaties. The Chinese people will recover them
without fail at an appropriate time. To demand "independence" for the two places...
means in fact to demand their detachment from China.
Khrushchev Group, supra note 11, at 382.
China's greater fear is that Taiwan could potentially claim a right to self-determination.
Even though it has not been subjected to non-Chinese domination since the Japanese left at the
end of World War II, its society has been functionally separate from that of the Mainland since
1949, and an incipient independence movement exists on the island. See Christiansen, Self-
Determination for the People of Taiwan, 14 CALIF. W. INT'L L. REv. 471 (1984); Chen &
Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599 (1972).
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not mean that international legal norms are irrelevant to the Hong Kong
problem, nor that international institutions can have no oversight role in
post-1997 Hong Kong. A brief examination of the development of the
"norm" of self-determination suggests that the international community
has legitimate interests in how China reasserts its sovereignty over Hong
Kong.
B. Hong Kong in the Era of Decolonization
When Great Britain resumed control over Hong Kong at the end of
World War II, the international order was changing rapidly. Empires
dissolved as the weakened Western powers yielded to demands for na-
tional independence throughout Asia and Africa. The United Nations
was founded amid hopes that the transition to a new order could be man-
aged peacefully.
1. Positive International Law
The United Nations has devoted a great deal of time and energy to
codifying internationally agreed-upon norms governing decolonization.
The thrust of these efforts has been to give content to the basic policy of
"respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of peoples."'27 In
1960, the General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 1514,
adopting the principle of self-determination as the central norm gov-
erning decolonization: "All peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. '28 The
primacy of this principle has been restated in both the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights29 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 30 repeated in numerous General
Assembly resolutions, 31 and embodied in rulings of the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.).32
27. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
28. Resolution 1514, supra note 20.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. I, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
30. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, para. 1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
31. See, eg., G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); G.A. Res. 2189, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 462 (1971) (citing Resolutions 2105 and
2189, supra, as examples of "the annual catch-all anti-colonial self-determination
resolutions").
32. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion, 1971 I.C.J. 14 (Advisory Opinion of June 21), at 31, para. 52 [hereinafter Namibia];
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 1 (Advisory Opinion of May 22) at 31, para. 55.
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Many commentators consider self-determination a "basic right of con-
temporary international law."'33 There is general agreement that this
right is "available to all peoples who are... functionally subjected to
colonialism." 34 Moreover, the I.C.J. has held that where the principle of
self-determination conflicts with the maintenance of "national unity and
territorial integrity, ' 35 the "freely expressed will and desire" of peoples is
to be the determining factor.36 In short, to judge from prescriptive for-
mulations of international law, the right of dependent peoples to deter-
mine for themselves their post-colonial political order is one of the most
cherished norms of the modem world.
2. The Realities of State Behavior
Self-determination has played an important role in post-World War II
international relations. The United Nations has successfully overseen
the transition of a number colonies either to full independence, 37 or to
33. Reisman, The Case of Western Somaliland: An International Legal Perspective, HORN
OF AFRICA 13 (1978), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 164 (1981); see also Fenet, The Eritrean People and the Princi-
ple of Self-Determination Within the Framework of the United Nations, in THE ERITREAN
CASE 280, 281-83 (Proceedings of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal of the International
League for the Rights and Liberations of Peoples, 1982). Contra Emerson, supra note 31.
34. Reisman, supra note 33, at 166; see also Principles Which Should Guide Members in
Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for
under Art. 73(e) of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, discussed in Reisman, supra note 33, at 164.
35. Resolution 1514, supra note 20, art. 6.
36. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 68, para. 162 (discussing Resolution 1514, art. 5); see
also Reisman, supra note 33, at 166. In a more recent case, the I.C.J. considered the potential
conflict between "the right of peoples to self-determination," Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. -, para. 25 (Judgment of Dec. 22,
1986) (preliminary release), and the principle of utipossidetisjuris, the "essence of [which] ...
lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when
independence is achieved." Id. at _, para. 23. In relying upon utipossidetis to determine the
boundary dispute submitted to it through the Special Agreement of the parties, the Court
makes clear that it intended to strengthen rather than derogate the principle of self-
determination:
At first sight this principle conflicts outright with ... the right of peoples to self-determi-
nation. In fact, however, the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often
seen as the wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have strug-
gled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the continent
of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential requirement of stability in order to
survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, has in-
duced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to
take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples.
Id. at -, para. 25. In a separate opinion concurring in the operative provisions of the judg-
ment, Judge Luchaire asserted that the principle of self-determination takes precedence over
the principle of maintenance of colonial boundaries: "[T]he frontiers of an independent State
emerging from colonization may differ from the frontiers of the colony which it replaces, and
this may actually result from the exercise of the right of self-determination." Id. at - (sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Luchaire).
37. Libya, for example, was "the first independent state born under United Nations aegis."
R. NYROP, J. ANTHONY, B. BENDERLY, W. COVER, N. PARKER & S. TELEKI, AREA HAND-
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freely-chosen incorporation into a neighboring state.38 Where the super-
powers have been willing, either the moral force of the norm or the per-
ceived benefits flowing from compliance have led to self-determined
change in political systems39 or to association with another state on a
more equal footing.4° Where the superpowers' perceived security inter-
ests are at stake,41 however, or the complexity of competing historical
claims is too great,42 the claims of dependent peoples to change their
political status have proven ineffectual.
BOOK FOR LIBYA 31 (1973). The question of how Libya, an Italian colony before World War
II, should be governed was turned over to the U.N. by the Allied powers after the war. These
powers administered the territory until the U.N. decided its fate. M. KHADDURI, MODERN
LIBYA: A STUDY IN POLITIcAL DEVELOPMENT 127 (1963). The General Assembly, after
studying the matter, resolved that Libya should be constituted as an independent nation, and
appointed a commissioner to oversee this process and ensure that foreign domination of Libya
ended by 1952. Id. at 134-36. On December 24, 1951, Libya duly proclaimed its indepen-
dence. Id. at 213.
38. British Togoland, for example, opted by majority vote in a U.N.-supervised plebiscite
to unite with the independent Gold Coast nation. This union formed the state of Ghana on
March 6, 1957. Chen & Reisman, supra note 26, at 662 n.236. See also Burkina Faso v.
Republic of Mali, 1986 I.C.J. - (separate opinion of Judge Luchaire) (discussing additional
examples of exercises of self-determination resulting in integration with neighboring states).
39. The Soviet Union's surprising decision to accept an end to Allied occupation of Aus-
tria in exchange for a declaration of Austrian neutrality presents such an example in the con-
text of "alien domination," also covered by Resolution 1514. See DAS NEUE OSTERREICH:
GESCHICHTE DER ZWEITEN REPUBLIK 110-15 (E. Weinzierl & K. Skalink eds. 1975). The
USSR's decision made possible the May 15, 1955, signing of a "State Treaty for the Reestab-
lishment of an Independent Democratic Austria," the subsequent withdrawal of all occupying
forces, and today's independent, neutral Austria. See Kohn, The Future of Austria, HEAD-
LINE SERIES/FOREIGN POL'Y A. 44-49 (July-Aug. 1955).
40. United Nations' oversight of Puerto Rico arguably falls into this category. In 1953 the
General Assembly certified that Puerto Rico's "commonwealth" status with the United States
"represented a 'free and democratic' expression of the will of the population of Puerto Rico,
that the Puerto Rican people had 'effectively exercised their right to self-determination,' and
that the territory was no longer to be considered 'non-self-governing.'" M. POMERANCE,
supra note 25, at 93 n.141 (quoting Cessation of the Transmission of Information under Arti-
cle 73(e) of the Charter in Respect of Puerto Rico, G.A. Res. 748, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
17) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
41. The USSR's inclusion of distinct ethnic groups within its national territory and its
domination of its Eastern European satellites have both been attacked as denying the right of
distinct peoples to self-determination. See, e.g., Meissner, The Right of Self-Determination
After Helsinki and Its Significance for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375
(1981) (criticizing the Soviet Union for denying Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania a say in deter-
mining their political futures). The USSR has defended its actions on national and collective
security grounds. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Coun-
tries, Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968, reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 33, at
175, 176 (defending Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on ground that self-determination by
Eastern bloc nations "must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamen-
tal interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide struggle for socialism"). The
United States has also been criticized for denying self-determination rights to territories in
which it perceives vital security interests. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Associa-
tion-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
4-7 (1980).
42. This is the situation of the Palestinian people. See, e.g., Collins, Self-Determination in
International Law: the Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137 (1980); Weiler, Israel
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More important for the Hong Kong problem, where a neighboring
state has desired to incorporate the decolonizing territory, the United
Nations has been ineffective in enforcing the right to self-determina-
tion.43 Even where international bodies have authoritatively stated that a
people is entitled to determine its own future, this has not constrained
expansionist states.
In the Namibia case, for example, the International Court of Justice,
in ordering South Africa out of Namibia, noted that the "development of
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determi-
nation applicable to all of them."44 South Africa has ignored both the
Court's decision and a U.N.-ordered embargo, however, and continues to
administer Namibia today. In Western Sahara, the International Court
considered the claims of two contending nations, both of which could
demonstrate "legal ties" based on historical connections, to territory that
had been colonized by Spain.45 The Court found these ties inadequate to
"affect the application.., of the principle of self-determination through
the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Terri-
tory."'46 Yet Morocco ignored the Court and the United Nations and has
occupied the Western Sahara to this day.47
This brief review suggests that the "universal right" to self-determina-
tion, though effective at encouraging Western nations to give up their
colonies, has been of little assistance to decolonizing peoples bordered by
states seeking to annex their territory. While the classification of self-
determination as a "right" may have encouraged dependent peoples to
aspire to recognition of their distinct status, the fact that the interna-
tional system lacks an effective mechanism for monitoring and sanction-
and the Creation of a Palestinian State: The Art of the Possible and the Impossible, 17 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 287 (1982).
43. Decolonization of the Italian colony of Eritrea, for example, was accomplished under
U.N. auspices by declaring Eritrea "'an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the
sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.'" G. TREVASKIS, ERITREA: A COLONY IN TRANSI-
TION: 1941-52, at 113 (1960) (quoting the U.N. General Assembly). Because Eritrea was weak
relative to the neighbor with which it was federated, it was recognized from the outset that
Ethiopia's "temptation to subject Eritrea firmly under her own control will always be great."
Id. at 131. In fact, Ethiopia has yielded to this temptation. The promised autonomy did not
materialize, and the government of Ethiopia has dominated Eritrean politics and culture.
There have also been persistent claims of brutal persecution of Eritreans. See Dines, Ethiopian
Repression in Eritrea, in THE ERITREAN CASE, supra note 33, at 308; Permanent Peoples'
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion on Eritrea, in id. at 357, 375-76. The international community has
done nothing to compel Ethiopia to honor its promise, and the country is currently engulfed in
civil war.
44. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31, para. 52.
45. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 40, para. 85.
46. Id. at 68, para. 162.
47. See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 711-17 (1976).
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ing states that subjugate decolonizing peoples has severely curtailed the
fulfillment of those aspirations.
48
3. International Norms Governing Hong Kong's Decolonization
Two international legal norms are implicated in the transfer of Hong
Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty: self-determination-a legiti-
mate aspiration of Hong Kong residents as a group-and the protection
of human rights, which involves the treatment of individual residents.
Thus even in the context of a bilateral agreement such as the one con-
cluded between Britain and China, compliance with these international
norms merits world attention.
a. Self-Determination
China's refusal to allow Hong Kong residents to play a formal role in
the negotiations that produced the Declaration violated the norm of self-
determination for decolonizing peoples. 49 China's sheer power, its im-
portance in the world order, its historical claims to the territory, and its
devotion to the ideology of national reunification have enabled it to opt
out of the formal decolonization structure.50 Other nations, apparently
recognizing the futility of opposing China on this point, have rarely chal-
lenged its claim.5 1
The British initially argued for a role for the people of Hong Kong in
the decision-making process. They eventually yielded to China's deter-
mination to recover sovereignty and concentrated instead on structuring
48. For a critical discussion of the U.N.'s "shopping mart" approach to reconciling the
"inherently conflicting" principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, see M.
POMERANCE, supra note 25, at 46-47.
49. The applicability of the norm of self-determination to the Hong Kong problem has
been partially discussed in Amberg, supra note 3. Amberg argued, however, that "[t]he es-
sence of self-determination is the method, not the result," id. at 855, and recommended
"[d]iscussions within the General Assembly regarding self-determination in Hong Kong...
before the treaty is formalized [in 1985]." Id. at 858. Given China's past insistence that Hong
Kong's decolonization was not a matter within the U.N.'s jurisdiction, and the U.N,'s accept-
ance of this contention (see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text), this suggestion was
unrealistic. Not suprisingly, the U.N. has made no moves toward taking on a role in supervis-
ing Hong Kong's transition. More importantly, focusing exclusively on the "method" of
decolonization obscures the legitimate interest that the international community has in the
post-1997 result of Hong Kong's transfer to the PRC. See infra notes 53-56 and accompany-
ing text.
50. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; Mushkat, The Transition from British to
Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion of Salient International Legal Issues, 14 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 176-77 (1986) (discussing China's "rigid" view of sovereignty as the
source of its persistent criticism of "international interference in domestic affairs" of sovereign
nations).
51. See Chiu, The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy, 22 ISSUES & STUD.
76, 78 (June 1986) (describing U.S. attitude as "hands off"); COHEN & CHIU, supra note 11, at
381 (China's rebuff to Soviet attempt to address decolonization of Macao).
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a post-1997 order that promised Hong Kong the maximum autonomy
consistent with Chinese sovereignty. The PRC, to its credit, agreed to
govern Hong Kong according to a "one country, two systems"
formula.52 If faithfully implemented, this formula could afford Hong
Kong residents a substantial degree of autonomy and the opportunity to
maintain the distinctive culture and lifestyle they have developed over
the last century.
Although the PRC's agreement is in the form of a bilateral treaty to
which Hong Kong residents are not a party,53 these residents have a sep-
arate right, based on the international law of decolonization, to demand
PRC compliance with the Declaration's provisions for a "high degree" of
autonomy.5 4 The norm of self-determination entitles Hong Kong-
which is, after all, a colony 55-to some measure of control over its own
destiny. Though China would hotly dispute this assessment, insisting
that "Hong Kong compatriots" are an integral part of Chinese society,
its position is belied by China's resistance to allowing the question of
their identity to be put to them directly. The international community,
therefore, has a responsibility to do all it can to see that China lives up to
the terms of the Declaration and that Hong Kong residents enjoy as
many of their substantive international legal rights as possible.
56
52. See supra note 7.
53. See infra text accompanying note 88.
54. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 2.
55. Britain has, where possible, referred to Hong Kong as a "territory" rather than a "col-
ony" in recent years, apparently in deference to China's sensitivity regarding this term. See
supra notes 24, 26. Nevertheless, Hong Kong remains a "British Dependent Territory." D.
BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 29.
Because Hong Kong residents have lived under "alien domination," they fit the U.N. defini-
tion of a "distinct people." Resolution 1514, supra note 20; G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 34; see
also Reisman, supra note 33, at 166 (concluding that right to self-determination is available to
all peoples "functionally subjected to colonialism"). They are distinct from the people of the
PRC as well as from the British. This does not mean that residents of Hong Kong are any
more or less "Chinese" than residents of the PRC, but only that they have developed, through
living in distinct circumstances, a distinctive culture. See Wong, Modernization, supra note 6.
This is precisely the focus of the international standard. The "core" of the self-determination
norm is the insistence that a people historically subjected to alien domination must not be, in
the attempt to correct this historical wrong, "hand[ed] about from sovereignty to sovereignty
as if they were property." THE NEw DEMOCRACY: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES,
AND OTHER PAPERS 411 (1926), quoted in Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determina-
tion: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1976) (statement of
President Wilson). Self-determination is no less violated by transfer and subsequent domina-
tion by an ethnically related nation then by continued foreign domination. See Franck, supra
note 47, at 694 ("Morocco's ... denial of self-determination to the Sahrawi people radically
departs from the norms of decolonization .... ").
56. The fact that international interest in Hong Kong has not been formally expressed
through the United Nations decolonization framework does not mean that the world does not
consider the norm to be applicable to this colony in transition. Rather, it could suggest the
difference between U.N. formulations of the self-determination norm and the "moral andpolit-
ical desideratum" which is "held more widely today than ever before." M. POMERANCE, supra
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b. Human Rights
Human rights, "the idea of our times,"'57 imposes on the world com-
munity an additional obligation to oversee the implementation of the
Declaration. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights58 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights59 list the right to
leave one's country as a basic human right. Many, perhaps most, Hong
Kong "compatriots" availed themselves of this right when they chose to
leave China. Returning those Hong Kong residents without their con-
sent to the control of the country they left effectively violates this norm.
An even less palatable feature of the Hong Kong plan is the return to
PRC control of those who came to Hong Kong as refugees from that
country. While no estimate is available of the number of Hong Kong
residents who fled China because of a "well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of ... religion, . . . membership of a particular social
group or political opinion,"' 60 and who therefore meet the internationally
accepted definition of refugee,61 no one familiar with China's turbulent
history can doubt that the number is very large.62 Returning these refu-
gees to Chinese control could violate a basic principle of international
note 25, at 73-76. Pomerance distinguishes these two approaches in a way that has obvious
relevance to the Hong Kong problem. She believes that, as put forward by the U.N.:
[S]elf-determination has become, not a continuum of rights, but an "all or nothing" prop-
osition: maximal rights, including independence, to the meritorious "selves"; no rights at
all to those whose claims to self-determination are rejected as unworthy....
[T]he exercise of the right of self-determination is generally seen as a "one-shot affair."
Once validly exercised-in the form, preferably, of full independence-the right ceases to
exist for all those trapped within the new "legitimated" borders.
Id. at 74-75. She concludes that the U.N. framework is not law, but "imposture," id. at 76,
which "stands in opposition to a more realistic, flexible, and universal concept of self-determi-
nation." Id. at 74. Her assertion that self-determination is a "continuing" right, id. at 75,
expressible through "a plethora of possible solutions, rather than as a rigid absolute right to
full 'external' self-determination in the form of complete independence," id. at 74, may have
relevance for self-determination even where, as in Hong Kong, a people has been denied input
into the process of planning their political future.
57. R. EDWARDS, L. HENKIN & A. NATHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA 1 (1986).
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, para. 2, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 74 (1948), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, BASIC DOCU-
MENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 320, 321 (1980).
59. Supra note 29, art. 12, para. 2.
60. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. l(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. See generally G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFU-
GEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
61. Until 1980 the Hong Kong government followed a "touch base" policy toward Chinese
immigrants, automatically granting residence permits to those who crossed into Kowloon un-
detected. See D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 50-51. Consequently there exists no formal
record of an immigrant's reason for coming to Hong Kong.
62. Non-technical sources regularly refer to "half" of Hong Kong's population as refu-
gees. Iyer, supra note 7, at 51.
262
Post-1997 Hong Kong Courts
refugee law: a refugee may not be returned to the nation he has fled if he
is likely to face further persecution.
63
These individual rights norms give the international community a le-
gitimate interest in ensuring that Hong Kong residents are not mis-
treated after 1997. China has pledged to Britain that it will respect these
norms. The Declaration provides that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights will remain in force in the HKSAR 64 even
though China itself is not a party.65 It also enumerates a comprehensive
list of rights that, if respected, will satisfy international standards.
The interest of the international community remains legitimate despite
China's success at removing the transfer process from the formal
decolonization scheme. This international concern does not mean that
Hong Kong residents can reasonably rely on international enforcement
of their rights; indeed, the review of prior decolonization cases suggests
just the opposite. Rather, the applicability of international norms in
post-1997 Hong Kong might be a source of additional leverage in the
efforts of Hong Kong residents to preserve their own rights. China has
agreed, by sovereign act and equal treaty, to grant Hong Kong the core
element of self-determination-autonomy-and basic human rights. It
has accepted a potential framework for international oversight: interna-
tional organizations in which Hong Kong may maintain a separate mem-
bership after 1997.66 To benefit from this leverage, as well as to focus its
own efforts on maintaining autonomy, Hong Kong needs an independent
institution that can both call on China to respect the rights of its resi-
dents and authoritatively report to the local and international communi-
ties on PRC compliance with the Declaration.
The next three sections examine the governmental structure that Brit-
ain and China have imposed on Hong Kong and identifies the judiciary
as the institution most capable of ensuring that Hong Kong residents
retain their promised rights and autonomy. The final section considers
how this institution, combined with functional international oversight,
can augment the efforts of Hong Kong residents to determine, to the
greatest possible extent consistent with Chinese sovereignty, their own
destiny.
63. This principle is known as non-refoulement. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 60, at 69-
100; see also Protocol, supra note 60, art. 33.
64. Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, art. XIII, para. 4 [hereinafter Annex I].
65. Mushkat, supra note 50, at 177.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 192-96.
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II. The Legal Status and Basic Policies of the Declaration
The Declaration sets out the framework under which China will
(re)assume sovereignty over the British colony in 1997. It obligates Brit-
ain to "restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China' 67 and
China to "establish . . .a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
[HKSAR] ... [that] will enjoy a high degree of autonomy. 68 China has
pledged in the Declaration to limit the exercise of its sovereignty in a
number of ways: "The current social and economic systems in Hong
Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and free-
doms... will be ensured by law.... Private property... will be pro-
tected by law."'69 In addition, "the socialist system and socialist policies
shall not be practised in the [HKSAR] and... Hong Kong's previous
capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 50 years."'70
Virtually all commentators reviewing the Declaration's likely impact
have glossed over the specific provisions in favor of more general pro-
nouncements about its historical, economic, or political context. Opti-
mists believe that, because China (1) earns much hard currency through
Hong Kong, and (2) wants to set a precedent that will entice Taiwan
toward eventual reunification, it will voluntarily abide by the agreement's
general tenor rather than strictly interpret or ignore it.71 Pessimists fo-
cus on the PRC's record of erratic and often violent political change, and
view the possibility of China following any consistent course for the fifty
years prescribed in the Declaration as unlikely.72
67. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2.
68. Id. art. 3, paras. 1, 2.
69. Id. art. 3, para. 5.
70. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 1.
71. This appears to be the view of the U.S. government. In an address at Yale University,
Burton Levin, U.S. Consul General to Hong Kong from 1981-86, expressed a "leaning toward
optimism," predicting that China would leave Hong Kong alone as long as it needed hard
currency for internal development and an enticing example for Taiwan. Address by Burton
Levin, Yale University (Feb. 9, 1987) (notes on file with the Yale Journal of International
Law); see also, e.g., Day, supra note 10, at 648 (footnote omitted):
If the PRC honors the agreement, it... will demonstrate to the world that it has become
a respectable member of the international community. It will earn great economic re-
wards from the capital exchange inflows and increased contact with the capitalistic soci-
ety. This recent agreement also lessens military tension in the region and may lay the
foundation for a special reunion with Taiwan.
See also Karamanian, supra note 9, at 187-88; Cheng, An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight
in Hong Kong, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 683 (1985).
72. The Nationalist government on Taiwan sees "no possibility of success for the 'one
country, two systems' formula outlined in the Declaration." Shaw, supra note 12, at 29.
Domes, The Impact of the Hong Kong Problem and the Hong Kong Agreement on PRC Domes-
tic Politics, 22 IssuEs & STUD. 31, 51 (June 1986), concludes, based on an analysis of internal
elite dynamics in the PRC, that "there is only a rather limited room for optimism about Hong
Kong's future." Mushkat, though not wholly pessimistic, notes that "willingness ... on the
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These writers are undoubtedly correct that the "macro" context is ulti-
mately more important than the details of the agreement. If China re-
mains stable and adheres to the "one country, two systems" ideal, then
the document will be seen as an unnecessary excess of British legalism. If
China descends once again into political chaos, the document will be a
useless piece of paper, incapable of restraining naked power.73
Between these extremes, however, lies the political and legal arena in
which Hong Kong residents are most likely to live in the near future.
These people, who must implement and make the best of the system pre-
scribed in the Declaration, are well aware that it will not protect them
from catastrophic change in China. They also doubt that China's mod-
ernization and liberalization, the trends uppermost in the minds of opti-
mistic commentators, will proceed without interruption. 74 For Hong
Kong residents, the important question is what role they can play in real-
izing the Declaration's promises in the event that China does attempt to
conform its conduct to the Declaration.
Before speculating on whether any international treaty can constrain
China's treatment of its own territory, it is important to understand pre-
cisely what China has committed itself to on paper. The next sections
explore the constitutional framework of the HKSAR and how the Decla-
ration provides for its governance.
A. The Declaration, the Basic Law, and the PRC Constitution
It must be mentioned at the outset that any discussion of the PRC
Constitution as a constraint on central government activity has a certain
never-never-land quality. The PRC has changed constitutions fre-
quently,75 and these documents can be more accurately characterized as
descriptions of prevailing policy aspirations than as embodiments of un-
part of the PRC to tolerate an autonomous Hong Kong may not be matched by its ability to
achieve this in practice." Mushkat, supra note 50, at 184.
73. The former U.S. Consul General to Hong Kong suggested that the British were overly
legalistic in insisting on such a detailed document, since no mere agreement could constrain a
nation intent on asserting its own interests: "What country wouldn't abrogate a treaty when
that treaty ceased to be in its interest?" Levin, supra note 71.
74. See, e.g., Kronholz, Jittery Colony. Few in Hong Kong Still Trust Promises of Britain
and China, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
75. The present constitution, adopted by the National People's Congress (NPC), Decem-
ber 4, 1982, was the fourth in the PRC's thirty-eight years of existence. Hsia, Haun, Hambley
& Johnson, The People's Republic of China, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD I (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986). The NPC has the power to amend the consti-
tution by two-thirds majority vote. PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, art. 62, para. 1 & art.
64.
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changing principles binding on the government. 76 A correct understand-
ing of the HKSAR's theoretical place in the PRC legal system is
nonetheless important: it can indicate the sources from which local au-
thority will stem and the manner in which Hong Kong residents may
effectively frame and pursue complaints arising from any PRC abridg-
ment of their autonomy or rights.
The Declaration is an international agreement between Britain and
China.77 It is not a self-executing agreement, but rather binds "the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China... to implement" 78 the prin-
ciples agreed upon by adopting a "Basic Law" of the HKSAR.79 China
has promised that the National People's Congress (NPC), its legislature,
will pass implementing legislation.80 Authority to govern one part of the
nation under a separate legal structure comes from article 31 of the PRC
Constitution, which provides that China "may establish special adminis-
trative regions when necessary."81
Since both China and Britain agree that at least this part of China's
Constitution will apply to the HKSAR,82 there is concern that China
might assert "the priority of the general provisions in the constitution of
the PRC over those of the 'Basic Law.' -83 The relation between the
national constitution and the Hong Kong "mini-constitution" has been a
topic of debate among legal scholars in Hong Kong.8 4 Of particular con-
cern is whether article 67(4) will apply to Hong Kong. This article gives
the Standing Committee of the NPC power to "interpret statutes." The
76. Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 1, 20 (1987); see also
Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794 (Sept. 1978).
77. Calling the agreement a "declaration" instead of a treaty does not make it any less a
binding obligation. See Mushkat, supra note 50, at 191-92; Recent Developments, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 249, 250 n.8 (1985).
78. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 7.
79. Id. art. 3, para. 12.
80. Id.
81. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
82. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 1, can be read to require the entire Basic Law to
conform to China's Constitution: "The National People's Congress... shall enact and pro-
mulgate a Basic Law... in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
.... "(emphasis added). The Chinese text is equally ambiguous.
83. Domes, supra note 72, at 51.
84. See, eg., Clarke, Hong Kong Under the Chinese Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 71
(1984) (suggesting that article 31 is "controlled" by article 5, which provides that "(n]o law or
administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the Constitution"). A Confer-
ence on Constitutional Law and Basic Laws, held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong
from November 28 through December 2, 1986, discussed this issue at length. See Davis, The
HKSAR Basic Law and the Concept of Constitutional Judicial Review 4 (text of address
presented at Conference) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law); Fung,
Interpretation of the Basic Law 11 (text of address presented at conference) (copy on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law); see also The Law Takes Shape, FAR E. ECON. REV. 38
(Dec. 18, 1986) [hereinafter The Law Takes Shape].
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Basic Law will be a statute, albeit one implementing an international ob-
ligation. By announcing interpretations of the Basic Law that contradict
opinions of the HKSAR high court, the Standing Committee could
sharply limit the value of the power of "final adjudication" that the Dec-
laration vests in HKSAR courts.85
Applying article 67(4) in this manner would, however, violate China's
agreement with Britain. The Chinese Constitution allows the creation of
Special Administrative Regions with systems "prescribed by law... in
light of the specific conditions."' 86 By signing the Declaration, China has
undertaken to use this authority to set apart one part of the nation-the
HKSAR-in which an "independent judiciary" would have the power of
"final adjudication. T87 Although, as a constitutional matter, the Stand-
ing Committee could overrule Hong Kong courts under article 67(4),
such an action would render them neither independent nor final, in viola-
tion of China's obligation to Britain.
Hong Kong residents cannot, even as a purely theoretical matter, look
to China's Constitution as a constraint on national government authority
to interpret, amend, or even abolish the Basic Law as it sees fit. A basic
attribute of sovereignty is the power to break international agreements if
a state chooses to suffer the international consequences.88 Since the Dec-
laration is an agreement between co-equal sovereigns, China is techni-
85. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 2; see also Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement
on Hong Kong and Its Implications for China's Unification, 21 ISSUES & STUD. 13, 17-19
(April 1985) (arguing that the greatest threat to HKSAR autonomy is that both the legislative
and the interpretive powers of the Basic Law belong to the NPC).
86. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 31.
87. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 2.
88. Under certain conditions abrogation of agreements is sanctioned by international law.
Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which China is not a party, see
Mushkat, supra note 50, at 177, provides:
(1) A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not
provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal un-
less:
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
Reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 699 (1969). The "nature" of the Declaration is "resum[ption] of
sovereignty." Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1. This implies a right on China's part to termi-
nate if it determines that a different way of ruling Hong Kong would be essential to the secur-
ity of the city, or of the nation of which it is a part.
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus would provide justification for abandoning the basic poli-
cies in many circumstances. The Declaration obligates China to maintain Hong Kong's econ-
omy unchanged for fifty years. If conditions beyond China's control-an international
recession that dried up export markets, for example-undermined Hong Kong's "prosperity
and stability," Declaration (Preamble), supra note 1, then China could claim a right to disre-
gard the Declaration and impose new policies under article 62 of the Vienna Convention:
(1) A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
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cally answerable only to Britain if it interprets its implementing
legislation in a way that breaks its bilateral pledge. It has made no pact
with the people of Hong Kong; thus they have no constitutional claim if
the NPC exercises its power to interpret their rights out of existence.
The drafting of the Basic Law has already begun.8 9 Although Hong
Kong is currently beset by worries that China is drafting a Basic Law
that either does not accurately reflect the Declaration or interprets it so
strictly that its promise of "a high degree of autonomy" is rendered illu-
sory,90 this article will proceed on the assumption that the Basic Law will
initially conform to a strict, but reasonable, interpretation of the words of
the Declaration. 91 This assumption could certainly be wrong; the Basic
Law Drafting Committee is stacked in China's favor.92 Moreover, China
lacks an understanding of Hong Kong's skittish market society, and
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty
unless:
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
Reprinted in 8 I.L.M. at 702.
These formal notions are not likely to be relevant. Britain has never suggested any intent to
use force to compel Chinese compliance, and it is highly doubtful that it could do so, whatever
its intent.
89. A Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) will produce a first draft in 1988. Fifty-
eight people sit on the BLDC, of whom twenty-three are from Hong Kong and thirty-five from
the PRC. Unequal Voices, supra note 4, at 40. The BLDC has established a Basic Law Con-
sultative Committee (BLCC), composed of 180 Hong Kong residents, as a mechanism to allow
Hong Kong's concerns to inform the drafting process. Id. The NPC will promulgate the Basic
Law in 1990.
While Hong Kong residents have a formal vote-though one that, because of their minority
status, carries little weight-the British government may in fact have more influence on the
eventual form of the Basic Law. Annex II of the Declaration establishes a "Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group" (JLG) to "conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declara-
tion." Since the obligation to preserve Hong Kong's rights and lifestyle is owed to Britain
rather than to the people of Hong Kong, Britain's input as to what it accepts as meeting the
letter and spirit of the Declaration is likely to carry more weight than Hong Kong's protesta-
tions regarding what it would like to see in the Basic Law.
90. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 2. See Unequal Voices, supra note 4, at 40; The
Peking Machine Carries All Before It, FAR E. ECON. REV. 44 (Dec. 18, 1986).
91. See Mushkat, supra note 50, at 193 (There is "little doubt that China will take the
necessary formal steps to implement the Joint Declaration.").
92. In addition, recent events in China could portend political upheaval in the not-too-
distant future. Student protests in December 1986 calling for "more freedom and democracy"
and the consequent resignation of Hu Yaobang, head of China's Communist Party (see
Southerland, Hu Resigns As Party Chief, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 6), has aroused
concerns, not yet dissipated, that China's recent liberalizing trend is about to end. See id.;
Kronholz, supra note 74. China has at best a mediocre record of implementing legal guaran-
tees where the recipients are its own citizens. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 827-36. If a Basic
Law unacceptable to the people of Hong Kong is promulgated, there will be little for them to
do but suffer in silence or "vote with their feet."
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often shows a xenophobic distrust of the people of Hong Kong and their
suggestions for the future.
93
Yet other factors must be considered. China has consistently shown
restraint in its treatment of Hong Kong by pursuing a negotiated end to
treaties that it denounced as "unequal" relics of an embarrassing past,94
despite its power to bring Hong Kong to its knees without even a formal
threat of invasion.95 In the short term-at least through the Basic Law
drafting process-its pride at recovering Hong Kong, the wealthiest and
most modem Chinese city in the world, its desire to benefit from Hong
Kong's financial and personnel resources, and its concern for its own
international image are likely to cause China to pursue a gentler policy.96
One can thus assume that the Basic Law will conform, on paper, to the
Joint Declaration. The more important question is what a system of gov-
ernment based on this document will mean in terms of Hong Kong's
ability to preserve its basic civil rights and unique lifestyle over time.97
B. The Basic Policies of the HKSAR
Three major themes run through the Declaration that must be embod-
ied in the Basic Law: autonomy, continuity, and individual rights.
1. Autonomy
The Declaration states that the HKSAR "will enjoy a high degree of
autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs, which are the responsi-
bility of the Central People's Government."9" Much of the Declaration
93. This distrust has roots both in Hong Kong residents' long exposure to foreign ways
and in linguistic and cultural differences between the northern and inland Chinese who domi-
nate the PRC and the Cantonese who make up most of Hong Kong's population.
94. See Day, supra note 10, at 629-33 (summary of the history of British acquisition and
administration of Hong Kong); D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 19-27.
95. China supplies most of Hong Kong's water and food. Day, supra note 10, at 627.
Levin, supra note 71, noted that the Chinese have been capable since 1949 of "snuffing out"
Hong Kong, but "consistently put their interests ahead of their emotions." See also Jao, supra
note 13, at 121.
96. See supra note 71 for sources detailing the reasons for optimism.
97. Because this article describes the system that would result from a strict but reasonable
interpretation of the Declaration, it also provides a reference point with which to compare the
Basic Law when it is issued. A Basic Law that does not permit the minimal safeguards for the
rights and lifestyle of the people of Hong Kong herein described will both violate the Declara-
tion and, more likely than not, herald unpleasant change.
98. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 2. This article also states that the HKSAR
"will be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the [PRC]." At
first blush these sentences appear contradictory. Indeed, the examples of Tibet, Xinjiang, and
other "Autonomous Regions" to which the PRC purports to grant a large measure of auton-
omy chill hopes for Hong Kong. The first sentence, however, means only that the HKSAR
will not be part of Guangdong Province, and thus will not be answerable to provincial govern-
ment authorities. See Hong Kong Government, Explanatory Notes accompanying the Decla-
ration, supra note 1, para. 5, reprinted in D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 197.
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is devoted to explaining how, and over what subjects, the HKSAR will
exercise this autonomy. For example, the HKSAR is to exercise fiscal, 99
monetary, 100 legislative,101 judicial, 10 2 customs,10 3 and police1°4 powers
without direction from the central government.
The autonomy clause' 0 5 contains one glaring exception: "foreign and
defence affairs." The need for China to take over responsibility for Hong
Kong's defense is not debatable; who would defend Hong Kong if China
did not? It must be recognized, however, that this clause gives China a
ready-made justification for far-reaching interference in the city's inter-
nal affairs. "Foreign affairs" could cover many aspects of life in Hong
Kong, one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. People, goods,
and information flow through Hong Kong from around the world.
China could regulate or interfere in a variety of legal and personal rela-
tionships in the name of foreign affairs, and the Joint Declaration offers
no avenue of local review or even protest against a policy imposed by
invoking this right. 0 6 Should China enter another period of xenophobia
and paranoia, this clause could provide legal justification for pervasive
interference with Hong Kong's autonomy.
10 7
2. Continuity
Permeating the Declaration is the fundamental policy requiring that
reversion of sovereignty to China in 1997 have virtually no impact on the
daily lives of Hong Kong residents. Article 3(5) provides that "[t]he cur-
rent social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged,
99. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 8.
100. Id. art. 3, para. 7 (Hong Kong currency is to be distinct from that of the PRC).
101. Id. art. 3, para. 3; Annex I, supra note 64, art. II.
102. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3; Annex I, supra note 64, art. III.
103. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 6.
104. Id. art. 3, para. 11.
105. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
106. Annex I, supra note 64, art. XII draws a distinction between the internal affairs of the
HKSAR and China's defense affairs:
The maintenance of public order in the [HKSAR] shall be the responsibility of the [HK-
SAR] Government. Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be sta-
tioned in the [HKSAR] for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs
of the [HKSAR].
See also Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 11. "Defence" is not defined, however, and the
determination of what is necessary to the national defense is one that nations typically insist
falls within their sole and unreviewable discretion.
107. Such irrationality might have to be on an even grander scale than the Cultural
Revolution. During those years Hong Kong was allowed to prosper, except for a brief period
of leftist-inspired riots in 1967, apparently because of its function as China's window to the
world. Levin, supra note 71. See also Domes, supra note 72, at 49 (contending that the course
of the Hong Kong riots was determined by factional confrontation between the "Cultural Rev-
olutionary Left" and "remnants of the State administrative machine" which, as quickly as
possible, countermanded the leftist policy of promoting turmoil in Hong Kong).
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and so will the lifestyle." Annex I elaborates at article VI(1): "The
[HKSAR] shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems pre-
viously practised in Hong Kong." Article 3(3) of the Declaration applies
the principle of continuity to Hong Kong law: "The laws currently in
force will remain basically unchanged."
These provisions obligate China to maintain the status quo for fifty
years.108 To keep its promise, China will have to refrain from imposing
on Hong Kong obviously intrusive social policies109 or centralized eco-
nomic directives that other parts of the Declaration expressly disavow.110
The uncompromising language of the Declaration, however, leaves the
boundary of permissible Chinese action less than clear. Without inter-
pretation, the rigid requirement that Hong Kong's "social and economic
systems, and.., lifestyle" remain "unchanged" is so plainly unfulfillable
as to be nearly meaningless. Flexibility and change are, in some ways,
the very essence of Hong Kong society; not a decade has gone by since
World War II in which major changes did not take place. Sixty years
from this writing, even without the resumption of Chinese sovereignty,
Hong Kong would probably be unrecognizable to those who know it
only in its present form. "[Mlaintain[ing] the capitalist economy and
trade systems previously practised" and keeping Hong Kong's laws "ba-
sically unchanged" ' similarly require interpretation. If the policy of
continuity is to be of practical use in post-1997 Hong Kong, some mech-
anism that takes into account the city's inevitable evolution must be de-
veloped to measure PRC and HKSAR government practice against the
Declaration's provisions.
108. "The above-stated basic policies of the [PRC] regarding Hong Kong and the elabora-
tion of them in Annex I... will remain unchanged for 50 years." Declaration, supra note 1,
art. 3, para. 12.
109. Mandatory family planning, which might be contemplated because of Hong Kong's
crowded conditions, is one example of such an intrusive policy. The government of Singapore,
one of the more "modern" Chinese territories, has shown a willingness to meddle in this
area-albeit with the opposite intent. See Liu, His Brave New World: Lee Kwan Yew Gets
Singapore Ready for the Future, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 40 (discussing government pro-
grams to improve the genetic make-up of the population through incentives for highly edu-
cated women to reproduce and for uneducated women to be sterilized). Mandatory "political
study," see H. LIANG & J. SHAPIRO, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN CHINA AFTER MAO, supra
note 23, at 34-39, would be another example.
110. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, paras. 5, 7.
111. Even in the United States, where stability based on predictable law is widely per-
ceived as a national strength, some would argue that changes in "basic" law have occurred in a
timespan of less than fifty years. The civil rights movement, for example, which abolished
legal segregation and transformed the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, began only in 1954.
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3. Individual Rights
The Declaration contains what might be called a "bill of rights" for
Hong Kong residents:
Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press,
of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of
strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief
will be ensured by law in the [HKSAR]. Private property, ownership of
enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be
protected by law.'12
This section pledges both that the enumerated rights "will be ensured by
law" and that the HKSAR government "shall maintain" these rights. 1
3
The list of rights to be protected is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
it contains all the rights typically associated with "free" societies.' 14 Sec-
ond, it is a thorough rendering of the rights that China's government has
denied to its own citizenry, either continuously or for long periods, since
1949.115 China's current Constitution contains a lengthy section on the
"Rights and Duties" of citizens.1 6 Article 35, for example, states that
"citizens of the [PRC] enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
of association, of procession and of demonstration." On the other hand,
citizens' "freedom and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective .... ,"117 If the rights granted Hong
Kong residents are no more a constraint on government authority than
112. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 5. Annex I formulates the guarantee differ-
ently, and contains several additional rights:
The [HKSAR] Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the
laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the
press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of
travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic
research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a
family freely.
Supra note 64, Art. XIII, para. 1 (rights not mentioned in art. 3, para. 5 of the Declaration are
emphasized).
113. Annex I, supra note 64, art. XIII, para. 1. These rights apply to both "inhabitants [of
the HKSAR] and other persons in the [HKSAR]." Id.
114. Compare with U.S. CONST. amends. I-XIV; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 58.
115. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. This is not meant as a comparison between
the PRC and the pre-1949 Nationalist government, a topic beyond the scope of this article.
Before the establishment of the PRC, civil war and foreign occupation so disrupted China that
individual rights were trampled from all sides, not least by the KMT government. See gener-
ally, L. PYE, CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION 121-50 (3d ed. 1984). For an analysis of the KMT's
limited ideological commitment to individual rights, see Greiff, The Principle of Human Rights
in Nationalist China: John C.H. Wu and the Ideological Origins of the 1946 Constitution, 103
CHINA Q. 441 (1985).
116. PRC CONSTrTUTION, supra note 6, arts. 33-56.
117. Id. art. 51.
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those granted by the PRC Constitution, Hong Kong will face a grim
future.
The above analysis shows that China has contracted, by treaty, to re-
spect Hong Kong residents' individual rights and distinct society. The
next section examines the institutional structures through which the
Declaration's basic policies are to become reality.
III. The Executive and the Legislature
The Declaration provides that the government of "Hong Kong,
China," 118 will consist of three branches: "[T]he [HKSAR] will be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power.... 119
Each branch will have different responsibilities, and each is endowed
with institutional characteristics from which one can predict its level of
autonomy from the Mainland.
The legislature is envisioned as a counterweight to the chief executive,
who will be appointed by the Central Government and can be expected
to pursue its policies. 120 The Declaration promises that "executive au-
thorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legisla-
ture."121 A crucial issue is therefore whether the Declaration's legislative
provisions will allow that branch to function as a meaningful constraint
on executive (i.e., central government) action. 122
118. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 10.
119. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3. The Declaration cannot be described with-
out "separation of powers" rhetoric. The use of American terminology should not, however,
distract the reader from the true issue, which is not the checks and balances among co-equal
"branches," but the checks on the national government's desire to govern the city with too
heavy a hand.
120. "The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the
basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally." Id. art. 3, para. 4; see also
Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 3 ("principle officials" must also be appointed by Beijing).
There is debate in Hong Kong over which option--election or consultation-will be imple-
mented. In either case, the power of appointment will give the National Government veto
power over the local choice. The chief executive and top government officials can thus be
expected to follow Beijing's line, as they have for decades followed London's. See The Law
Takes Shape, supra note 84, at 38 (the third plenary session of the BLDC held in Beijing from
November 29 to December 2, 1986, made clear that Beijing had veto power over the appoint-
ment of the chief executive, who would have substantial power and would be accountable to
the Beijing government as well as to the SAR.). This analysis will therefore proceed under the
hypothesis that, after 1997, executive actions in the HKSAR will express the policies of the
Central People's Government.
121. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 3. "Accountable" is not defined; an important
task of the BLDC will be to design an impeachment procedure for formal legislative sanction
of executive performance.
122. A second issue, considered in the following section, is whether the express legislative
power to hold the executive accountable means that the judiciary is foreclosed from exercising
this function. See infra text accompanying notes 141-91.
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Annex I provides that "[t]he legislative power of the [HKSAR] shall
be vested in the legislature of the [HKSAR]."' 123 This power is limited,
as are the executive and judicial powers, by the "foreign and defence
affairs" exception.124 Outside of this undefined area,
[t]he legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the
provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.
Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic
Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid. 125
The Declaration does not delineate the substantive areas in which the
legislature may pass statutes. The legislature's "power of the purse" will
be the same as that of Hong Kong's present legislature, which shares this
authority with the colonial government. 126 Other defined powers of the
HKSAR are to be exercised by the "government," meaning the executive
branch. 2 7 Since the executive authorities must "abide by the law and
shall be accountable to the legislature," however, government action
must be within the reach of the legislature's law-making authority.
Because the legislature must report its actions to the NPC "for the
record," the question arises whether the NPC has veto power over
HKSAR legislative action. For example, the NPC might refuse to enter
into the record a law it regarded as violating the Basic Law or proper
procedure. Since laws must be "in accordance with" both the Basic Law
and "legal procedures" (whatever these are), the Declaration clearly en-
visions a power of review to make this determination, and does not ex-
plicitly exclude the NPC from this role. 128 Review by the NPC,
however, would diminish both the appearance and the substance of the
legislature's autonomy. If applied to attempts to hold the executive "ac-
123. Annex I, supra note 64, art. II, para. 2.
124. Id. art. I, para. 2; see supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
125. Annex I, supra note 64, art. II, para. 2.
126. Id. art. V, para. 2. Currently the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council
"must approve all proposals involving the expenditure of public funds.... The standard view
of this committee.., is that its members work hard.., but typically defer to the government's
expenditure proposals." A. RABUSHKA, HONG KONG: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC FREEDOM 38
(1979). The Finance Committee has no power to initiate or increase expenditure proposals,
nor to raise revenue. Its only power is to "approve, reject or reduce expenditure proposed by
the government." H. Ho, THE FISCAL SYSTEM OF HONG KONG 14 (1979); see also Davies,
Fine Hopes Fade to Fears, FAR E. ECON. REV. 52, 55 (May 29, 1986).
127. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 3, distinguishes between "the government and
legislature of the [HKSAR]." See supra text accompanying notes 99-104 (listing areas of
authority).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 for a discussion of the power to interpret
statutes under art. 67, para. 4 of the PRC Constitution.
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countable," it would wholly remove this promised power from the legis-
lature, in violation of China's obligation to Britain.1 29
The legislature, unlike the executive branch, will "be constituted by
elections." 130 This provision has aroused perhaps more comment and
speculation in Hong Kong than any other, since elected representatives
have not played a significant role in Hong Kong government in the
past.131 The Declaration does not specify who will be eligible to vote or
to run for office, or whether elections will be direct or through an inter-
mediary "electoral college." The Basic Law will address these questions,
and Hong Kong is currently awash in rumors concerning how they will
be decided.' 32 There is widespread hope that the Basic Law will permit a
legislature that can "represent authoritatively the views of the people of
Hong Kong"1 33 and, by holding executive authorities "accountable to
the legislature,"' 134 protect Hong Kong's lifestyle and liberties.
These hopes are likely to be disappointed for three reasons. First, leg-
islatures are unwieldy institutions even in the best of circumstances. The
necessarily large number of disparate voices, all determined to be heard
129. In view of the PRC's likely ability to manipulate the legislature, see infra text accom-
panying notes 133-38, however, the more important issue is whether the Declaration autho-
rizes a local institution to act as a check on legislation which would infringe promised
freedoms, continuity, or autonomy. See infra text accompanying notes 141-91 for discussion
of that institution, the judiciary.
130. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 3.
131. Hong Kong's government now consists of an Executive Council (Exco), a Legislative
Council (Legco), an Urban Council, and District Boards. Exco consists of seventeen members,
all appointed by the governor. Six are members of the bureaucracy ("officials"), and eleven are
professional or business leaders ("unofficials"). Less influential is Legco, of whose fifty-seven
members (including the governor) thirty-two are "officials or local worthies appointed by the
governor. Twelve are elected by businessmen, lawyers, teachers and other professional groups.
The remaining twelve are indirectly chosen through a complicated system of electoral col-
leges-which include a role for individual voters." Sir David and the Goliath, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 28, 1987, at 43, 46. For a detailed description of the Legislative Council's composition,
procedures and power, see N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG
126-90 (1981). Since the signing of the Declaration, Britain has taken steps to make Hong
Kong's government more "representative." See Hong Kong Government, White Paper: The
Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong [hereinafter White Paper],
reprinted in D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 209.
132. The Law Takes Shape, supra note 84; Unequal Voices, supra note 4.
133. White Paper, supra note 131, para. 2(a). Much of the debate centers on how much
power should devolve on the local legislature before 1997. Some argue that "democratizing"
Hong Kong is the only way to make it capable of functioning autonomously. See, e.g., Lee,
Hong Kong Needs Democracy to Protect Its Freedoms, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 35, col. 2.
Others, especially business leaders, argue that too much democracy could destabilize Hong
Kong and harm its economy. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 126, at 54 (Many of Hong Kong's
richest entrepreneurs are trying to "persuade Peking that they equate democracy, even repre-
sentative government, with excessive wage levels, strikes and low productivity-in short, a
welfare state."). China has recently asserted its right to veto any major pre-1997 change by
making clear that any change in excess of Basic Law specifications will be repealed when that
document becomes effective. See The Law Takes Shape, supra note 84, at 38-39.
134. Annex I, supra note 64, art. I, para. 3.
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and counted, can be expected to respond together to only the most egre-
gious executive abuses. Even then, executive authorities (and thus, by
hypothesis, the PRC) will have certain advantages-for example, media
access and streamlined decision-making-which could enable the gov-
emnment to influence both popular opinion and legislators to support vio-
lations of promised liberties in the name of short-term goals.
Second, there is no precedent in either China or Hong Kong for a
legislature that acts as a check on executive authority. The PRC legisla-
ture, which was the only model China's negotiators knew when drafting
the Declaration, has apparent power under the Chinese Constitution1 35
to constrain government action. In fact, however, virtually all govern-
ment action, whether executive or legislative, is orchestrated by the Com-
munist Party, which is not even mentioned in the text of the
Constitution. 136 The NPC has never publicly opposed Party policy.
Rather, it has acted as its cheerleader, even in periods of severe abuses of
the citizenry. 137 Hong Kong, as a colony, has no first-hand experience
with representative democracy. 138 To expect a full-blown adversarial
congress to emerge in only ten years is unrealistic.
Finally, the legislature will lack the training and experience needed to
judge China's performance against a fixed standard. It is unlikely that
China will engage in unambiguous, egregious assaults on the rights and
freedoms of Hong Kong residents as a group. More probable will be a
gradual erosion of the city's autonomy, affecting only small numbers of
residents at any one time. Such actions will predictably be accompanied
by disclaimers of any intent to change the old order and arguments that
the action is in fact consistent with pre-1997 practice. As a new institu-
tion, the legislature lacks the experience and institutional history against
135. PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, arts. 57-78, (especially arts. 58, 62 & 63).
136. The Party is referred to only in the Preamble:
Both the victory of China's new-democratic revolution and the successes of its socialist
cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities under the leadership of
the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought ....
Id. Preamble.
137. See J. DOMES, THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF CHINA: 1949-1972, at 68 (1973) (NPC
served as forum for forced self-criticism which initiated the brutal "Anti-Rightist Campaign"
of 1957-58); A. Liv, How CHINA IS RULED 91-94 (1986). The NPC's weakness as a counter-
weight to Party power was best demonstrated during the Cultural Revolution; from 1965-75
the Congress was not convened. Cohen, supra note 76, at 801.
138. See A. RABUSHKA, supra note 126, at 36-38:
To begin with, Hong Kong is not a representative democracy....
Decisions of the legislature are typically consensual, with an occasional holdout or
two.... The Legislative Council rarely shows an inclination to withhold consent from
legislation proposed by the official bureaucracy.... The norm has been that official mo-
tions are unanimously accepted with little comment....
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which to judge such claims. Even if its members can agree on the desira-
bility of resisting executive (PRC) policy, the legislature will have diffi-
culty, because of its size and lack of experience in this task, enunciating a
convincing case that China is violating its pledge. Faced with a situation
in which China's misunderstanding of Hong Kong could undermine the
"one country, two systems" promise just as effectively as intentional in-
terference, the legislature's lack of institutional competence in expressing
Hong Kong's viewpoint is likely to make it a disappointment to those
who hope it will be a counterweight to PRC authority.
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the legislature could and should be
more than simply a debating society or a rubber stamp. It could provide
a forum in which opposition views might be aired. Its power over the
budget and taxation 139 could play a major role in maintaining or increas-
ing the city's prosperity and quality of life-admittedly the issues closest
to residents' hearts. 14° Commentators concerned for the future of the
city should follow closely the current debate underway in the BLDC
about the legislature's composition and procedures. Hopes for protecting
individual rights and the city's lifestyle, however, should be focused on
the judiciary.
IV. The Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
The Declaration prescribes a judiciary14' that will be independent
from both the PRC and the local political apparatus. It envisions courts
that review government action for conformity with the Declaration's ba-
sic policies of autonomy, continuity, and individual rights. If the govern-
ment violates these principles, the judiciary has, on paper, the authority
to record that fact and order compliance. The following sections ex-
amine the Declaration's provisions for an independent judiciary and ana-
lyze how this institution is likely to function in practice.
139. The BLDC's political subgroup has proposed that the legislature be empowered to
"approve the budget, [the] taxation proposal and [the] public expenditure." The Law Takes
Shape, supra note 84, at 38; see also supra note 126 (legislature now can only veto spending
proposals, not propose increases).
140. See Levin, supra note 71.
141. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3. Annex I describes the judiciary in far
greater detail than it does either of the other departments. Whereas the Declaration devotes
only four sentences to the composition and authority of both the executive, Annex I, supra
note 64, art. I, para. 3, and the legislature, id. arts. I, II & V, para. 2, it devotes seven
paragraphs to the judiciary. Id. art. III.
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A. Independence
The Declaration explicitly states that the judiciary will have an attri-
bute not conferred upon the executive or legislature: "The [HKSAR]
will be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial
power." 142 Other provisions amplify this theme: "The courts shall exer-
cise judicial power independently and free from any interference. Mem-




The Declaration specifies a judicial appointment process that should
favor competent, qualified people with potential for independent deci-
sion-making:
Judges of the [HKSAR] courts shall be appointed by the chief executive of
the [HKSAR] acting in accordance with the recommendation of an in-
dependent commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal
profession and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference
to their judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law
jurisdictions. 144
The appointment procedure has several flaws which, over time, could
reduce the independence of the judiciary. The chief executive (and, by
hypothesis, the PRC) apparently possesses a de facto veto power over the
appointment committee, since he could presumably decline to appoint
any recommended candidate. The "independent commission" might be
stacked with "eminent persons" who favored PRC policies, since only
judges have to be "local," while the "legal profession[als]" and "eminent
persons" making up the commission could be Mainlanders. 145 Finally,
"judicial qualities" remain undefined, and thus capable of widely varying
interpretation. 146
These weaknesses could, over the long run, enable the PRC to create a
pliant judiciary amenable to its policies and susceptible to political pres-
142. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3 (emphasis added).
143. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 2 (emphasis added).
144. Id. art. III, para. 3.
145. Since the Declaration could easily have specified "members of the HKS,4R bar" or
"eminent HKSAR residents," the drafters probably intended this result.
146. Witness the debate in the United States during the Senate Confirmation Hearings of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Whereas Senator Dole felt that Justice Rehnquist had "the sensitivity,
the compassion, certainly the integrity and the intellect to be the Chief Justice," Senator Rock-
efeller opposed the nomination because of an "overall sense that Mr. Rehnquist ... lacks the
sensitivity and potential for growth that the country has a right to expect from its Chief Jus-
tice." Motion on Rehnquist Debate Makes Vote Likely Tomorrow, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1986,
at A19, col. 1. "Judicial qualities" might even be attributed to nonlawyers; the Declaration
nowhere requires that judges have legal training.
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sure.147 In the short term they are not serious enough to undermine the
judiciary's independence. After 1997, the PRC will confront a body of
judges experienced under British rule.148 The courts will be accustomed
to independent decision-making and knowledgeable about standards for
measuring individual liberty and political interference in the judicial pro-
cess. 149 Their "institutional culture" will stress independence from and
suspicion of the "party line." 150 Thus, if China wishes to undermine the
independence of the judiciary through the appointment process, it will be
able to do so only gradually, as current judges leave the bench.
The Declaration's provision allowing appointment of judges "from
other common law jurisdictions" could, if any are actually appointed,
strengthen Hong Kong's judicial "culture." This provision would permit
147. For example, lower court judges might conform their decision-making to executive
standards, since the executive's veto would limit their professional advancement.
148. The Declaration states that such people may remain in office. Annex I, supra note 64,
art. IV, para. 1.
149. The independence of the judiciary is fundamental to the success of the Hong Kong
court system and its justified reputation for impartiality and scrupulous adherence to the
rule of law.... Through the years, decisions of the courts to protect the rights of individ-
uals and to check abuse of the powers of government have exercised great influence.
Thomas, The Hong Kong Legal System, 2 ECON. & L. 13, 14-15, 22 (1987) (author is currently
attorney general of Hong Kong).
Though there is debate over the extent to which Hong Kong courts currently restrain execu-
tive behavior that violates statutory or common law duties, reported cases make clear that
judges will, on occasion, rule against the government. One case suggests that such power is
routinely exercised. In that case, Re Ng Wai-chung, HCt, MP No. 2155 of 1983 (Oct. 12,
1983) (Rhind, J.), discussed in Notes of Cases, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 82 (1984) [hereinafter Ng
Wai-chung], the court confronted the question of whether the government could detain the
travel documents of a suspect in a corruption investigation after only an exparte hearing. The
statute authorizing such detention was ambiguous. The judge quashed the executive order
detaining the documents, commenting:
The Courts in my view are on a slippery slope once they co-operate in relinquishing well-
tested safeguards for the liberty of the individual such as the right to be heard in court
before a judicial officer who is more than a rubber stamp, unless there are compelling
reasons why the normal safeguards do not apply.
Id. at 83. See also Chu Piu-wing v. Attorney General, CA, Civ. App. No. 84 of 1984 (Sept. 4,
1984), discussed in Notes of Cases, 15 HONG KONG L.J. 399 (1985); R. v. Li Pak-keung, West-
ern Magistracy, ICAC prosecution, discussed in id. at 384.
Independence is not equivalent to the "activism" of American courts. Compare, e.g., Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) with R. v. Chan Keung-lee, CA, Cr. App. No. 73 of
1983 (no date given), discussed in Notes of Cases, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 238 (1984), in which
leave to appeal was denied a plaintiff who alleged severe beating and interference with his
attorney-client privilege by police during their investigation of rape charges against him. His
complaint was supported by credible medical evidence. Id. at 239. One of the three judges
who denied his petition expressed "doubts" as to whether the conviction should, "in the light
of [what] ... appeared to be gross misconduct by [the police] ... as a matter of principle, [be]
allowed to stand." Id. at 240. The petition was denied nonetheless.
150. The Declaration does not allow changes that would diminish the institutional inde-
pendence of the judiciary: "After the establishment of the [HKSAR], the judicial system pre-
viously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon
the vesting in the courts of the [HKSAR] of the power of final adjudication." Annex I, supra
note 64, art. III, para. 1.
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Hong Kong's local bar to continue to be supplemented with foreign law-
yers, a practice that could be crucial if a high percentage of the local bar
emigrates before 1997.151 Such appointments would also serve to rein-
force the common law tradition of judicial independence through the
presence of judicial colleagues whose objectivity would be enhanced by
their lack of long-term dependence on the PRC.
2. Removal
The procedure for removing judges constitutes another check on the
government's power to undermine the independence of the judicial
department:
A judge may only be removed for inability to discharge the functions of his
office, or for misbehaviour, by the chief executive of the [HKSAR] acting in
accordance with the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief
judge of the court of final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local
judges. Additionally, the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e.
those of the highest rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the
endorsement of the [HKSAR] legislature and reported to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.152
"Inability" and "misbehaviour" remain undefined. For all but "princi-
pal" judges, this procedure should nevertheless provide substantial pro-
tection, since the committee defining the terms apparently wil 1 53 be
made up of judges who might someday be subject to their own definition.
The provision for removal of a principal judge is ambiguously drafted: it
is not clear whether requiring legislative endorsement is to be the sole
check on the chief executive's removal authority, or a second check in
addition to the requirement of committee recommendation. 154 Because
the judiciary's most controversial activity could be enjoining executive
action that the legislature has attempted to legalize,15 5 the legislative en-
151. Expatriate lawyers make up a high percentage of the local bar. Of Chinese attorneys,
a large number have the necessary documents and academic credentials to resettle abroad
fairly easily. See Wesley-Smith, The Legal System, the Constitution, and the Future of Hong
Kong, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 137, 138 (1984).
152. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 3.
153. The English version of the treaty contains a potentially troubling ambiguity.
"[C]onsisting of not fewer than three local judges" could be read to allow for a committee of
more than three-for example, of seven-of whom three must be local judges. The Chinese
version is no less ambiguous. Id.
154. The words "a judge" and "additionally" suggest the latter meaning. If "judge" and
"principal judge" are read as the defining terms, however, the former is correct. Another
problem could arise if the executive were to cast a de facto veto by declining to follow a
committee recommendation. While this might leave some incompetent or scandalous judges
on the bench, it is not as serious a threat to judicial independence as the potential to remove
judges for political reasons.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
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dorsement requirement would be inadequate to maintain judicial inde-
pendence. If the Declaration's promise of an independent judiciary is to
be fulfilled, the Basic Law must make clear that the removal of principal
judges is a two-step process.
The Declaration's silence with regard to judicial salaries could portend
an even more significant problem. This silence might leave the executive
free to reduce or eliminate judicial salaries without the concurrence of
the legislature,15 6 and thereby to circumvent the individualized removal
process if the judiciary became a serious annoyance to the PRC. On the
other hand, the existing Hong Kong policy of non-diminution of salary
indicates that the practice is part of "the judicial system previously prac-
tised in Hong Kong [which] shall be maintained except for those changes
consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the [HKSAR] of the power
of final adjudication."1 57 The Declaration's emphasis on judicial inde-
pendence plainly requires the second interpretation.
3. Historical Precedent
In keeping with the "basic policy" of continuity,1 58 the judiciary will
follow the same procedures as and possess powers at least equal to those
of Hong Kong's present judiciary.1 59 The British common law courts in
Hong Kong today are "independent"; judges impartially apply rules of
law and equity, rather than current public policy, to the cases and parties
before them.1 60 This independence has been an important factor in creat-
ing an open and fluid society in which residents of different beliefs, ideol-
ogies, and nationalities have been free to better their lot if they are able,
156. See supra note 126 (legislature has no power to increase government expenditure
proposal).
157. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 1.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
159. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III.
160. See, eg., Jao, supra note 13, at 114 (arguing that a well-established legal system,
administered by an independent judiciary, protects personal liberty, other human rights, and
private property, and that the rule of law is one of three key factors in Hong Kong's success to
date). This description of Hong Kong courts is open to challenge on both factual and defini-
tional grounds. The "facts" of this contention can and should be explored through a review of
the words of the judges themselves in reported cases. Such a review, however, would not
address the definitional challenge that questions the notion that judges are ever independent of
their political, cultural, or class background. See, e.g., THE POLITIcs OF LAW 3 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982) (Judges' "[d]ecisions are predicated upon a complex mix of social, political, institu-
tional, experiential, and personal factors; however, they are expressed and justified ... in terms
of 'facts' . . . and 'law' that ha[ve] been objectively and rationally 'found' and 'applied.' ").
For present purposes, however, perfect independence is not required. This article contends
only that the judiciary today is thoroughly imbued with a formalistic sense of independence-
that is, its judges resent government efforts to dictate to them decisions they are accustomed to
making themselves, and take pride in standing up for principles. See, e.g., Ng Wai-chung,
supra note 149.
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untouched by political pressures or the cultural preferences of their lead-
ers.16' Policy choices made in London no doubt had more influence in
bringing about this state of affairs than judicial decisions made in Hong
Kong. Had the British not recognized the benefits of running their
"pearl of the orient" as a laissez-faire trade center,162 the society would
surely have evolved very differently. The courts have also played a role,
however, especially in the commercial realm, where their impartial adju-
dication and enforcement of contract rights have enabled individuals and
companies to conduct their private affairs with confidence that public
policy would not upset their plans. An independent judiciary, unlike a
broadly-empowered elected legislature or a local-resident executive, al-
ready exists.
B. Sources of Law
1. Internal
The Declaration specifies three sources of law for the HKSAR: "The
laws of the [HKSAR] shall be the Basic Law, and the laws previously in
force in Hong Kong and laws enacted by the [HKSAR] legislature."' 163
These sources, however, are not equal in authority. The Declaration pro-
vides that the Basic Law trumps contradictory provisions in both local
statutes' 64 and prior laws.
Prior laws appear at first glance to be subordinate to both the Basic
Law and subsequent local statutes:
After the establishment of the [HKSAR], the laws previously in force in
Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate
legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that con-
161. This is not to say that Hong Kong is a model society. It is, after all, a colony, charac-
terized by ethnic and economic tension between the expatriates, who are on average wealthier
and occupy more powerful positions, and the Chinese population. In the PRC, however, the
zone of individual autonomy remains much narrower. As recently as 1984, the "Spiritual
Pollution Campaign" dictated to PRC citizens what music or books they could safely enjoy.
During the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-58) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), various
forms of economic behavior and personal association were in and of themselves grounds for
legal persecution. See generally H. LIANG & J. SHAPIRO, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM IN
CHINA AFrER MAO, supra note 23.
162. See A. RABUSHKA, supra note 126, at 5-9, 21-24 (describing basic government policy
of "non-interventionism" in economy). China, while agreeing that "Britain's policies and ad-
ministrative methods have.., played a role" in creating Hong Kong's prosperity, gives credit
primarily to the "diligence, wisdom and meticulous management of ... Xianggang [Hong
Kong] residents of whom over 98 per cent are Chinese compatriots. Another very important
factor in Xianggang's prosperity has been the long years of vigorous support given by the
Chinese mainland in various fields." Britain s Argument Is Untenable, 26 BEIJING REV. 10, 10-
11 (Oct. 10, 1983).
163. Annex I, supra note 64, art. II, para. 3.
164. "Laws enacted by the [HKSAR] legislature which are in accordance with the Basic
Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid." Id.
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travene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the [HKSAR]
legislature.165
The HKSAR legislature could not, however, amend prior laws protect-
ing personal or property rights, or those essential to maintaining Hong
Kong's lifestyle. It is only empowered to enact "laws ... which are in
accordance with the Basic Law."'166 By specifying such a hierarchy,
China has both limited the legislature's authority and given Hong Kong
a document-though not a constitution 167-against which to measure lo-
cal statutes. If the basic policies of the Declaration are to be infringed
upon under color of law, this can only be done by the national govern-
ment through amendments to the Basic Law. 168
2. External
The Declaration provides that the courts, in deciding cases in accord-
ance with HKSAR law, "may refer to precedents in other common law
jurisdictions."' 169 "Refer" is not defined, but must mean that legal devel-
opments in other present and former British jurisdictions, while not auto-
matically incorporated into HKSAR law, may be used to supplement
Hong Kong's necessarily limited case law.' 70 If, for example, Hong
Kong's companies law stems from a common root with that of Britain,
India, and Australia, Hong Kong judges may seek guidance from the
experience of courts in those countries. The Declaration does not ad-
dress whether Hong Kong may continue to develop its common law
through reference to the decisions of courts in other countries, in the
limited areas where Hong Kong statutes and the Basic Law will not have
already preempted the field. 171
165. Id. art. II, para. 1 (emphasis added).
166. Id. art. II, para. 3.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
168. This means that the Declaration does not permit its own basic policies to be revised
under the guise of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong."
169. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 2.
170. Hong Kong's population of 5.5 million does not generate a large number of lawsuits.
See D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at 28.
171. Because the current legal system is to remain in place, and because evolution based on
case law is an integral part of the common law, the courts would appear to be able to continue
this process. This is the view of the Hong Kong government. See Hong Kong Government,
Explanatory Notes accompanying the Declaration, reprinted in D. BONAVIA, supra note 14, at
196. One commentator, however, "question[s] whether the preservation of the Common Law
system is the true intent of the... Joint Declaration":
Annex I, Section II... provides that "after the establishment of the [HKSAR] the laws
previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained .... ." It must be noted
that the three sources of law said to govern the Hong Kong SAR are to be the Basic Law,
existing law and legislation enacted by the SAR legislature. Further case law is not men-
tioned as a possible source of law. If judicial creativity be accepted as a hallmark of the
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Hong Kong's connection to other common law courts, including their
rules of procedure and judicial culture, is meant to endure. Article III
(4) of Annex I states that "the court of final appeal in the [HKSAR] ...
may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit
on the court of final appeal." This provision could be more important for
its potential to bring internationally respected judges to the Hong Kong
bench than for keeping the Hong Kong legal establishment in touch with
developments in substantive common law, a process that will presumably
continue through the law schools 172 and legal literature. If outside
judges sit on the courts, and these courts are able, as will be argued,
formally to consider the issues of compliance with the Declaration and
respect for individual rights, 173 then China has indeed agreed, albeit sub
rosa, to have its compliance with the Declaration reviewed by foreign,
probably British, authority. Even if the courts lack enforcement power,
this provision is extraordinary in view of China's historical insistence
that its internal affairs are its business alone.
C. The Courts' Role in Preserving Hong Kong
The Declaration's provision that "courts shall decide cases in accord-
ance with the laws of the [HKSAR]"' 174 raises two questions: (1) what
will qualify as a "case" which may come before the court, and (2) what
will happen if the various sources of "law" are in conflict?
1. Jurisdiction
The Declaration neither details the jurisdiction of the HKSAR courts
nor confers jurisdiction-granting authority upon any other institution.
By limiting the judiciary to deciding "cases," the Declaration appears to
bar the courts from commenting on executive actions or legislation with-
out an actual plaintiff to bring the case to their attention. This limitation
makes it particularly important that the courts speak firmly and indepen-
dently from the earliest opportunity; to lose the confidence of Hong
Kong residents would be to decrease the likelihood that plaintiffs would
common law system, is it not intended that the future legal system of Hong Kong should
be part of the common law family?
Fung, supra note 84, at 14.
172. There is currently only one degree-granting law school in Hong Kong, located at the
University of Hong Kong. Plans to open a second at City Polytechnic were announced in
October, 1986, in recognition of a "shortage of locally trained lawyers in Hong Kong." Hong
Kong Standard, Oct. 18, 1986. At present there are approximately 1200 practicing solicitors
and 250 barristers in Hong Kong, not counting government, in-house, and academic lawyers.
Leung, Book Review, 15 HONG KONG L.J. 432 (1985).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 183-88 for a discussion of the courts' power of
review.
174. Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 2.
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bring cases at all, since a plaintiff might fear reprisal if alleging PRC or
executive misconduct. A lack of plaintiffs would prevent the courts from
exercising their review as surely as would dismantling them, and would
cripple the judiciary as a "watchdog" over adherence to the
Declaration.175
Cases will come before a court by various avenues. Criminal cases will
be brought by a prosecutor who "shall control criminal prosecutions free
from any interference." 176 Civil and commercial suits will continue to be
brought by private parties, with minimal changes expected in either pro-
cedural 177 or substantive law. Most important, "[e]very person shall
have the right to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts. ' 178
This provision permits the courts to review actions of the executive
branch 179 for conformity both to the laws of Hong Kong and to the Dec-
laration. According to the Basic Law, which is likely to embody the
Declaration's fundamental policies, "executive authorities shall abide by
the law and shall be accountable to the legislature."1 80 A Hong Kong
resident whose civil or property rights are denied by the government-
for example, by banning a newspaper or closing a "decadent" night-
club-could petition the court for an injunction.181 If pre-1997 British
law provided no basis for the executive's action and the HKSAR legisla-
ture had passed no statute expressly authorizing it, the court should have
the power to declare the executive in violation of his duty to "abide by
the law." 18 2
175. Attorneys will play an important role in strengthening or destroying confidence in the
courts. The Declaration pledges that individuals will have a right to "confidential legal ad-
vice." Id. art. XIII, para. 2. Good lawyering will therefore be essential to make this pledge
meaningful.
176. Id. art. III, para. 5.
177. See id. art. III, para. 1 (regarding the maintenance of the current judicial system).
178. Id. art. XIII, para. 2.
179. The Basic Law must clarify that "executive" refers to the government as a whole, not
just to the chief executive. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 4; Annex I, supra note
64, art. I, para. 3 (specifying "chief executive" when referring only to that official). Since art.
I, para. 3 of Annex I, however, specifies "executive authorities" when denoting the government
as a whole, some ambiguity arguably exists in the Declaration as to the reach of the courts'
review power.
180. Id. art. I, para. 3.
181. Unfortunately this would not always be the case. Hong Kong's "Public Order Ordi-
nance," enacted in 1951, gives the government "powers to suppress newspapers and suspend
their publication, to refuse or suspend their registration, to prohibit the importation of publica-
tions, to make it an offence to print or publish anything 'subversive,' to seize printing presses
and to search, seize and forfeit printing equipment." Lau, More Press Freedom, FAR E. EcON.
REV. 10 (Jan. 8, 1987). This ordinance was last used during the 1967 riots, when the govern-
ment suspended three newspapers for six months. The Hong Kong government, calling the
ordinance "outdated," has proposed that it be amended to "greatly soften" its potential to
restrain the press. Ironically, the ordinance was first adopted to allow for control of the press
in the event that it was being manipulated by communists. Id.
182. It would apparently be up to the legislature to enforce the court's judgment, since it
alone is given the power to hold the executive authorities "accountable." Annex I, supra note
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2. Judicial Review
The judiciary is explicitly authorized to decide cases brought by indi-
viduals challenging the legality of executive action. Intrusive govern-
ment action authorized by local statute would conflict with the Basic
Law and with prior law; the court would then have to decide to which
source it should defer. Since the Declaration states that local laws that
conflict with the Basic Law are invalid, it would be the court's responsi-
bility to enforce this provision in any case that brought these two sources
into conflict.
Just as the judiciary will be able to review local statutes for compliance
with the Basic Law, so, too, will it be able to review the Basic Law, or
amendments thereto, for compliance with the Declaration. This author-
ity derives from China's sovereign decision, expressed in the Declara-
tion,183 to delegate to the local judiciary an independent power of final
adjudication over cases that implicate a national obligation. Where, for
example, a resident challenges a government action that abridges individ-
ual rights, the court's decision will necessarily implicate China's per-
formance under the Declaration. A holding that the Basic Law
permitted or required the abridgment would constitute a formal finding
that China had promulgated a Basic Law that violated its obligation to
"implement" the Declaration. 184 As final arbiters of the rights of Hong
Kong residents, the courts will have to assert their independence and rule
in cases that present such difficult issues. As a local institution empow-
ered to declare violations of the Declaration, however, the judiciary must
ensure that its interpretation of the Basic Law does not hold that the
national government has authorized violations that it did not in fact in-
tend. Such an interpretation, if erroneous, would improperly intrude
upon the authority to abrogate treaties which resides solely in the na-
tional government.1 8
5
These considerations suggest that Hong Kong courts should exercise
their review power according to the following rules of interpretation.
Judges should favor readings of local statutes that bar intrusive executive
action.186 Where this is not possible, courts should declare such laws in
64, art. I, para. 3. The courts may, however, retain the power to cite individuals for contempt
of court, which could be a potent factor in encouraging government officials to respect judicial
decisions.
183. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 7.
184. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (arguing that the right to abrogate treaties
is an inherent aspect of sovereignty).
186. See Ng Wai-chung, supra note 149, at 93 (The court interprets an ambiguous statute
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violation of the Basic Law. If the NPC "interprets" 187 the Basic Law
itself to allow intrusive government action in Hong Kong, or amends it
to create a new statutory basis for such action, the courts' role is to state,
in clear language, what the law was and what it has become. The courts
should avoid wherever possible interpreting NPC statutes so as to require
or allow violation of the Declaration; however, they must insist that if
China is to abrogate its international obligation in fact, it must explicitly
announce its intention to do so. In this way the courts can create a bar-
rier-perhaps built only of words, but potentially useful-to PRC activi-
ties that diverge from the policies of autonomy, continuity, and
individual rights. Explicit denunciation, of course, will always be beyond
the power of Hong Kong to prevent or cure. 188
The courts' role, then, is to enunciate the standards of the Declaration
and the Basic Law and to use these standards as a yardstick against
which to measure government conduct. By publicly stating that official
action conflicts with these standards, and by doing so with institutional
authority conferred by the Declaration and, one hopes, the Basic Law,
the judiciary can heighten the cost to China-measured in negative pub-
licity and lost investment dollars-of ruling Hong Kong with too heavy a
hand. In the short term, the judiciary, as an existing institution com-
posed of a few relatively clear voices, can also play a teaching role in
resolving the misunderstandings that will inevitably accompany Hong
Kong's "return" to the motherland. Because they can enunciate clearly
why certain government actions are unacceptable, the courts will be bet-
ter placed than the legislature to dissuade China from abandoning in
practice what is, on paper, a workable Hong Kong policy.
The role envisioned here for the courts differs markedly from that re-
cently suggested by legal scholars in Hong Kong who have discussed the
Declaration's provisions for the HKSAR judiciary. Two commentators
187. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88 (discussion of PRC Constitution's grant to
NPC of a right to interpret all statutes).
188. An example of the courts' authority to review the Basic Law against the Declaration
could well arise the first time the government defends challenged action on the grounds that it
is not subject to the courts' jurisdiction. If the action would have been within the jurisdiction
of the pre-1997 chamber of final appeal, the Privy Council-Hong Kong Government, Explan-
atory Notes accompanying the Declaration, para. 12, reprinted in D. BONAVIA, supra note 14,
at 198-then the Hong Kong courts will have to consider whether the Basic Law in fact con-
strains them in a way not envisioned by the Declaration. Because answering this question in
the affirmative would constitute a finding that China failed to "implement," Declaration, supra
note 1, art. 7, its promise to "maintain the judicial system previously practised ... except for
those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of the [HKSAR] of the power of final
adjudication," Annex I, supra note 64, art. III, para. 1, a court should take jurisdiction over
the case, in the absence of an unambiguous statement by China that the Basic Law compels a
different result. If China has by that time formally enunciated restrictive jurisdiction rules, the
court should decline to hear the case, but note, in doing so, that its lack of jurisdiction is a
change from prior practice.
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in particular189 have propounded the interpretation that, because the
PRC Constitution gives the NPC the power to interpret statutes, the
HKSAR courts' power of final adjudication will not include the author-
ity to determine whether post-1997 statutes conflict with the Basic Law.
Both writers advocate the creation of a higher body, composed of both
Hong Kong residents and Mainlanders, to which cases that raise the is-
sue of whether government action under color of local law violates the
Basic Law would be referred.
190
This proposal would effectively strip local courts of jurisdiction to hear
any case in which a HKSAR resident challenged government action.
Where a statute authorized the action, or where the executive could
claim that it did, judges would refer the issue to a body composed of at
least fifty percent Mainland jurists, thus wholly abdicating their role as
"final" arbiters of the disputes of Hong Kong residents. Such an institu-
189. Fung, supra note 84, and Davis, supra note 84.
190. In Interpretation of the Basic Law, Daniel R. Fung, a Hong Kong barrister and mem-
ber of the BLCC, advocates the creation of a "Constitutional Court... outside the framework
of the SAR courts." Fung, supra note 84, at 16. This court would "be constituted by an equal
number of PRC judges and SAR judges with the chairman to be given a casting vote in the
event of deadlock. The position of chairman should devolve upon the individual judges under
a system of rotation." Id. This is a dangerous proposal. Because PRC judges are not in-
dependent, this "court" would be unlikely to rule against China during periods of PRC chair-
manship. China could thus obtain judicial approval for far-reaching violations of its
agreement by simply timing them correctly.
Michael Davis, a lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, presented the most
searching examination of the usefulness of judicial review in post-1997 Hong Kong to date at
the November 28, 1986, Conference on Constitutional Law and Basic Laws. Davis, supra note
84. He explained, on theoretical and policy grounds, why the judiciary, an "institution com-
mitted to the incremental evolution of higher norms and principles in the process of dialogue,"
id. at 29, is well-suited to the job of reviewing laws passed by the HKSAR legislature for
conformity with the Basic Law. Like Fung, Davis feels the Declaration is ambiguous as to
who has final power to interpret statutes, id. at 29-30, and consequently sees a need for a
higher authority to resolve this tension. Id. at 30-31.
Davis's paper is not a textual analysis of the Declaration. Rather, it addresses the important
goal of trying to convince Hong Kong's common law judges, schooled in the notion of parlia-
mentary supremacy, of the value of holding the HKSAR legislature to a fixed set of written
principles. Unfortunately, by arguing for "constitutional judicial review," Davis invokes rhet-
oric inapposite in the Hong Kong context: "A constitution or a basic law is not a mere statute
but is instead some indication of the way a given society constitutes itself." Id. at 32-33. In
this he misapprehends the nature of the Basic Law, and, consequently, the role of the judiciary.
The Basic Law is a mere statute. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88. It is not an
"indication of the way [Hong Kong] constitutes itself," because Hong Kong has not consti-
tuted itself, but rather has been constituted by agreement between Britain and China. See
supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 88. Judges should refuse to give effect to a statute that
contravenes a law above it in the legal hierarchy, see supra text accompanying notes 163-68,
not because "evidence suggest[s] that constitutional review could be employed as an effective
motor to drive this system on the level of fundamental values development and stability en-
hancement," Davis, supra note 84, at 33, but because the PRC, in fulfilling its promise to
Britain, will have charged them with this responsibility. The mantle of constitutional rhetoric
will reduce the stature of the HKSAR courts in China's eyes because it does not fit. To be
effective the courts must clothe themselves in the more modest authority granted them by the
PRC.
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tion, charged with the task of choosing between interpretations arising
out of fundamentally different conceptions of the law, would at best add
a layer of obfuscation and uncertainty where the real need is for clarity
and predictability. For Hong Kong, a mixed court of higher appeal
could only serve to weaken the one independent "leg" promised in the
Declaration. For China, this untried institution would not add to its
power, inherent in the fact of sovereignty, to amend or "clarify" the Ba-
sic Law by national statute if divergent interpretations of a truly vital
issue arise.191 Happily for Hong Kong, China's agreement with Britain,
otherwise quite specific about the judiciary, contains no mention of such
a constitutional court.
V. Suggested Action
There are several practical ways in which Hong Kong residents, Brit-
ain, and the world community can increase the incentives for China to
give effect to the Declaration's promises of autonomy and individual
rights. These strategies fall into two main categories: (1) strengthening
the Hong Kong judiciary, and (2) affording a monitoring role to interna-
tional organizations.
A. Strengthening the Judiciary
Hong Kong's judiciary will be better equipped to perform the role out-
lined above if local leaders, scholars, and the British government take the
following steps:
1. Reject suggestions, from whatever source, to create a mixed PRC-
HKSAR judicial body to sit above the highest HKSAR court. Such an
institution would be inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Declara-
tion, which promises independent courts of final adjudication in the
HKSAR. By obscuring the Declaration's straightforward intent with
faulty constitutional reasoning, legal scholars threaten to undermine not
only the authority of the Hong Kong judiciary, but, more importantly,
judges' confidence in that authority, without which they are unlikely to
fulfill the monitoring role that China has offered them. By acting on
such proposals, Hong Kong would unilaterally give up a promising
source of leverage against Mainland domination.
2. Formally document, perhaps by government "White Paper," and
publicize both the precedents in which Hong Kong courts have ruled
against the government and the procedures followed in such cases. If
Hong Kong courts have been open in the past to residents wishing to
191. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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challenge government action, and judges have not been deciding cases
based on prevailing government policy, it is necessary to assert this fact
openly. Although China might not accept these contentions, a thorough
appraisal of the Hong Kong legal system could heighten public under-
standing of the legal process and raise the status of the courts in the eyes
of residents and foreign observers. Furthermore, if the Declaration's
promise of continuity with current practice and procedure for fifty years
is to have any hope of fulfillment, an authoritative baseline is needed
against which the judiciary's performance can be measured long after
today's judges and attorneys have passed from the scene.
3. Review and reorganize if necessary the system of publishing court
reports, and distribute those reports as widely as possible. The courts'
unique attribute is their ability to document China's treatment of Hong
Kong in a systematic and reasoned way. Their ability to impose costs on
China for violations of basic policies is entirely dependent on their ability
to inform Hong Kong residents and international observers about the
local situation. Heavy investment in legal "infrastructure," such as inter-
national indexing and electronic publishing of Hong Kong case reports,
would make it far easier to chart the progress of autonomy and the pres-
ervation of individual rights. The knowledge that their opinions would
reach a wider audience might also increase the resolve of Hong Kong
judges to work to preserve their independence.
4. Improve the size and quality of local law schools. Without a well-
trained local bar, legal remedies will be inaccessible to Hong Kong resi-
dents. Moreover, a judiciary that is forced to draw from a limited local
talent pool or to depend on foreign "mercenaries" is unlikely to have the
skill, sensitivity, or commitment to withstand the certain challenges to its
authority.
5. Adopt a reciprocal system by which, just as British judges may
serve in Hong Kong after 1997, judges in Hong Kong may be chosen to
serve in Britain. By allowing service on the Hong Kong bench to count
as a step on the career path of a common law judge, Britain could pro-
vide an incentive for current Hong Kong judges to remain in the HK-
SAR after 1997. Such a system would also increase the likelihood that
Hong Kong judges would work independently of Beijing, and add a for-
mal procedure for monitoring that independence.
These suggestions may seem quite academic: study, teach, buy more
books. Dramatic solutions do not exist in this context, however, because
Hong Kong simply does not have the power to implement them. The
HKSAR can work toward autonomy only by maintaining its economic
value to China while at the same time doing everything possible to raise
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the cost to China of changing course. These modest suggestions could
help make the courts an impediment to any PRC inclination to remake
Hong Kong in its own image.
B. A Role for International Organizations
If Hong Kong courts exercise the independent review function de-
scribed above, they can offer the world a lens through which to monitor
the development of Hong Kong's autonomy and individual rights. The
Declaration provides for an institutional structure that gives other na-
tions and international institutions both authorization to oversee Hong
Kong's transition to sovereign control by the PRC, and an interest in
carrying out this oversight.
China has agreed that Hong Kong may participate as a separate entity
in international trade agreements and quota schemes, notably the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Multifibre Agree-
ment (MFA).192 Hong Kong will also be permitted to retain
membership in international organizations in which it currently partici-
pates as an autonomous entity. 193 If Hong Kong maintains its autono-
mous position in the web of international organizations as promised,
China's treatment of it will be subject to continual international over-
sight. If, as contended above, the world community places value on af-
fording historically distinct peoples maximum control over their political
destiny, 194 even where another nation's territorial claims foreclose the
preferred formula of independence for these peoples, international orga-
nizations will provide a ready means for monitoring Hong Kong's
progress.
These ties could do more than provide an observation platform, how-
ever. The trade organizations in particular have "teeth," since they
could impose costs on China for abridging Hong Kong's autonomy.
China itself is seeking to join the GATT 195 and to increase its allotments
192. Annex I, supra note 64, art. VI, para. 3.
193. Id. art. XI, para. 1. At present these organizations are: the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the
Asian Productivity Organization, and the Asian Development Bank. Mushkat, supra note 50,
at 172.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 49-66.
195. China became an observer at the GATT in 1984. J. OF CoM., Jan. 7, 1984, at 5.
Hong Kong became a contracting party of the GATT in 1986. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 322 (2d ed. 1986). Some of
the legal issues raised by China's desire to join the GATT are discussed at id. Wang, China's
Membership in GATT, 2 ECON. & L. 33, 34 (1987), comments on the benefits to China of
preferential treatment for its exports by other contracting parties. See also Mushkat, supra
note 50, at 195-99.
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in various quota and preferential trade regimes. 196 By maintaining Hong
Kong's membership in these regimes as an autonomous entity, China
stands to "get two bites at the apple." International organizations and
Hong Kong's trade partners, based on their responsibility to further,
where possible, Hong Kong's self-determination and human rights,
197
should welcome this opportunity to encourage and oversee the realiza-
tion of Hong Kong's rights. They should accept this arrangement as
long as Hong Kong is in fact autonomous. 198 If Hong Kong becomes
just another Chinese city, China should lose its singular privilege of
double membership. Hong Kong court judgments will be an important
source of information if these organizations adopt formal procedures to
review Hong Kong's status at regular intervals after 1997.
C. If the Promises Are Broken
The international community and Hong Kong courts will have an im-
portant responsibility if China's absorption of Hong Kong does not pro-
ceed as promised. If the PRC does not respect Hong Kong residents'
rights and lifestyle, many will seek refuge elsewhere. The courts must
insist on their prerogative to review China's implementation of the Dec-
laration so that, in the worst-case scenario, Hong Kong residents will
have an authoritative record to cite if forced to seek asylum elsewhere.
Countries that would act on the much-discussed norm of self-determina-
tion for decolonized peoples should monitor post-1997 Hong Kong
closely so that their immigration policies can, if necessary, allow as many
individual Hong Kong residents as possible to "determine" their desti-
nies elsewhere if their collective autonomy does not materialize.
Conclusion
This analysis may perhaps be criticized as a quixotic effort, an exces-
sively legalistic endeavor in a realm where the cold realities of unequal
power make such details irrelevant. China, after all, unquestionably has
the power to change the Basic Law, abolish or emasculate the courts, and
transform Hong Kong's lifestyle at will. But all power ultimately does
not come from the barrel of a gun.199 National decision-makers rarely
act without taking possible reactions of other nations into account, and
196. China was admitted as a party to the Multifibre Agreement on Dec. 15, 1983. China
Admitted to GATT Group, 27 BEIJING REV. 11 (Jan. 2, 1984).
197. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
198. For an argument that protectionist sentiment will prevent this from occurring, see
Mushkat, supra note 50, at 196-97.
199. QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSETUNG 61 (Foreign Language Press 1976).
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those reactions are shaped in part by convictions about what is fight.
Where there is wide agreement on a norm, as in the decolonization con-
text, a state can be expected to consider world expectations and avoid
policies that it anticipates will violate them. 200 Moreover, states arrive at
decisions and policies by way of internal political struggles, cost-benefit
analyses, institutional and personal rivalries, and other factors which to-
gether make up-even for a totalitarian country-the national will.201
Individual assessments of how important it is to control Hong Kong,
how difficult such control will be to implement, and how costly it will be
in terms of international political capital, will determine how China
treats the city in all but the most extreme circumstances.
It is at this level that the judiciary can make a difference. The courts
have the statutory authority and existing institutional culture to make
the intrusive exercise of China's power over Hong Kong costly and
troublesome by making it open and explicit rather than gradual and
quiet. A truly independent judiciary could not only ensure fair treatment
for the individuals who come before it, but also serve as an onsite moni-
tor for the world community, which itself has both a legitimate interest
in the situation of Hong Kong residents after 1997 and the potential lev-
erage to encourage China to respect the territory's autonomy and rights.
The effectiveness of the judiciary could be a major determinant of Hong
Kong's ability to reconcile the promise of continuity with the inevitable
social evolution that the fifty years after 1997 will bring. As long as
China does not radically change course,20 2 the Declaration offers the ju-
diciary a central role in the future development of the territory. The
question is whether the courts will grasp the significance of the role being
offered them, and have the courage and integrity to accept it.
200. "[E]ven those who do not regularly use the word 'law' in their discourse, and even
those who snicker when others use it, must make estimates about the subjectivities of allies and
adversaries alike. These subjectivities necessarily include what those actors think is right."
Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International
Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1984).
201. See generally G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971).
202. For an analysis of the likelihood that China's stability will outlast Deng Xiaoping, see
Oksenberg, China's Confident Nationalism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 501 (1986).
